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SECTION 8 (a) (3) OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT: A RATIONALE-PART II
ENCOURAGEMENT OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF
MEMBERSHIP IN ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION
AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMPLOYER MOTIVE
Benjamin M. Shieber* and Shelby H. Moore, Jr.**

"[T]he office of all the Judges is always to make such
construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress the subtle inventions and evasions
for continuance of the mischief..., and to add force and life
to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act

....

"

Heydens Case, 26 Eliz., 3 Coke 7, 8.

INTRODUCTION

Section 8(a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act makes
it an "unfair labor practice for an employer.., by discrimination
in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization .

. . ."I

In an earlier article2 one of the

authors concluded that, for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3),
discrimination is employer treatment of employees affecting their
employment conditions caused by employee exercise of Section 7
rights, e.g., the rights to engage in self-organization and collective
bargaining. 8
To complete a rationale of Section 8 (a) (3), we here consider
the "encourage [ment] or discourage[ment] [of] membership in
any labor organization," and the significance of the employer's
motive in determining whether employer conduct constitutes an
unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (3). Completion of the
rationale of Section 8 (a) (3) facilitates examination of the extent
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
" Member, New Orleans Bar.
Mr. Moore's principal contribution involved research for this article.
The authors thank Professor Gerald LeVan of LSU Law School for his editorial assistance.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
2. See Shleber, Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relation Act; A
Rationale: Part I. Discrimination, 29 LA. L. REv. 46 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Shieber: Part I.].

3. Id. at 76-77.
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to which that section and Section 8(a) (1) overlap. The article
therefore concludes with an examination of this overlap.
I.

ENCOURAGEMENT OR DISCOURAGEMENT OF

MEMBERSHIP

IN ANY

LABOR ORGANIZATION

A. "Membership in Any Labor Orgranization"
It is clear that the labor organization referred to in Section
8 (a) (3) is not necessarily a labor union. The term "labor organization" as defined in the Act is not limited to labor unions but
includes:
"any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in
part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."4
Furthermore, the Board and the courts have not limited
employer violations of Section 8(a) (3) to interference with employees actually joining a labor organization, but to any interference with concerted employee activities protected by the Act.
Thus, in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., the Supreme Court
said:
"Discouraging membership in a labor organization 'includes
discouraging participation in concerted activities... such as a
legitimate strike.' ... Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233
(1963)."5
Although the Supreme Court's decisions in this area involve
cases in which a labor organization existed or was being formed,6
the decisions of the Board and the courts of appeal have not been
so limited.7 Thus, in a 1943 case, the Board, overruling one of
its trial examiners, held:
4. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970).
5. 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967). Accord, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389
U.S. 375, 878 (1967); American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313
(1965).
6. See note 5 8upra.
7. Worthington Creamery & Produce Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 121, 122-23 (1943).
Accord, 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 161 (1952); 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 61-62 (1950);
Ablon Poultry & Egg Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 827 (1961); Jamestown Veneer &
Plywood Corp., 93 N.L.R.B. 101, 123-25 (1951); Smith Victory Corp., 90
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"We are of the opinion and we find that, irrespective of
whether such concerted activity resulted from any interest
or activity in a labor organization, such discrimination has
the effect of discouraging the formation of and membership
in a labor organization, which is the customary instrument
utilized by employees in exercising the right to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, as guaranteed by Section 7
of the Act, and constitutes an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of Section 8(3) of the Act."
Such decisions appear logical since any employer interference
with the exercise of Section 7 rights must necessarily have some
effect upon employee membership in a labor organization when
an employee has an opportunity to become a member. Further,
these decisions seem consistent with Congress' intention to protect employees not only from interference in actually joining a
labor organization, but from employer interference in the exercise of the rights of self-organization in general. This is clear from
the Senate Report on Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act, the original
enactment containing these provisions of Section 8 (a) (3):
"[I]f the right to be free from employer interference in
self-organization or to join or refrain from joining a labor
organization is to have any practical meaning, it must be
accompanied by assurance that its exercise will not result in
discriminatory treatment or loss of the opportunity for
work."
Thus, the prohibition of Section 8(a) (3) on employer encouragement or discouragement of "membership in any labor
organization" includes any employer interference with employee
exercise of Section 7 rights.
B. Proof of Actual Encouragement or Discouragement
Not Required
In the leading case of Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 10 the
N.L.R.B. 2089 (1950), aff'1d, 190 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1951). Contra, Gibbs Corp.,

131 N.L.R.B. 955 (1961); Getman, Rect4on 8(a)(8) of the NLRA and the
Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice, S2 U. CHL L. REv. 735, 757 n. 83,

761 n. 101 (1965).
8. Worthington Creamery & Produce Co., 52 N.L.R.B. 121, 122-23 (1948).
9. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Bess. 11 (1935), reprinted 4n 2 NLRB
LE0aSLATwIv HIsTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 2311 (1935) [hereinafter cited as 1935 Lo. HIST.] (emphasis added).
10. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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employers argued that their acts had not in fact encouraged any
employees to join a labor union because all the employees were
either union members or desired to join or were ineligible to do
so. The Supreme Court held that there need be no showing that
any employee was in fact encouraged to join any labor organization:
"The Board relies heavily upon the House Report on
§ 8 (3), which stated that the section outlawed discrimination
'which tends to "encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization,"' for its conclusion that only a tendency
to encourage or discourage membership is required by §
8(a) (3). We read this language to mean that subjective
evidence of employee response was not contemplated by the
drafters, and to accord with our holding that such proof is
not required where encouragement or discouragement can
be reasonably inferred from the nature of the discrimina11
tion.
In a recent case the employer argued that its actions were
not violative of Section 8 (a) (3) because 95% of its employees
were union members and there had been no showing that its
actions had actually discouraged any employee from joining a
union. The Sixth Circuit held that such a showing was not
required.12 It quoted with approval from the opinion of the
Board's trial examiner that, "'[ilt is enough that the behavior
complained of, or the rules of conduct unilaterally imposed and
enforced by the employer, tend in that direction."'", This tendency, and not proof of actual discouragement, is all that is
required.
C. Section 8(a)(3) Does Not Prohibit All Employer
Encouragement or Discouragementof Employee
Exercise of Section 7 Rights
It is clear that not all employer actions that encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization are violative of
Section 8 (a) (3). For example, an employer who follows a general policy of providing its employees with better wages and
11. Id. at 50-51.
12. Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 904 (1969). Accord, Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 F.2d 760,
772-73 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
13. 401 F.2d at 686.
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working conditions than those received by employees working
under collective bargaining agreements in the same industry may
thereby discourage his employees from seeking membership in
labor organizations. But certainly such employer action does
not violate Section 8 (a) (3).14 Similarly,
"[A]n employer may discharge an employee because he is
not performing his work adequately, whether or not the
employee happens to be a union organizer .... Yet a court
could hardly reverse a Board finding that such firing would
5
foreseeably tend to discourage union activity."'
What then distinguishes employer actions that discourage
(or encourage) union membership and do not violate Section
8(a) (3) from those that discourage (or encourage) and are
violative of that section?' 6
The language of Section 8(a) (3) makes it clear that, "the
only encouragement or discouragement of union membership
banned by the Act is that which is 'accomplished by discrimination.'"17 As the Court unequivocally stated in Radio Officers':
"The language of § 8 (a) (3) is not ambiguous. The unfair labor practice is for an employer to encourage or discourage membership by means of discrimination. Thus this
section does not outlaw all encouragement or discouragement
of membership in labor organizations; only such as is accomplished by discrimination is prohibited." 8
And since to constitute discrimination for purposes of Section
8 (a) (3), employer action must be caused by employee exercise of
14. See NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d 1306, 1310 (1st Cir. 1969).
15. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 679 (1961) (Harlan,
J., concurring).
16. Employer conduct that is "discrimination" and that encourage8
union membership may also be violative of Section 8(a)(3). Radio Officers'
Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954). Because analysis of when such employer
conduct is violative of Section 8(a)(3) would be similar to analysis of when
"discrimination" that discourages union membership is violative of Section
8(a) (3) and because relatively few cases involve employer encouragement of
union membership, this article generally speaks only of discouragement of
union membership.
17. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 676 (1961). The quoted
statement is only correct if limited to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Section
8(a)(1) prohibits encouragement or discouragement of union membership
even if it is not "accomplished by discrimination." See NLRB v. Burnup
& Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
18. 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954).
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Section 7 rights,19 neither a liberal wage policy nor the discharge
of an employee union organizer because of his inadequate job
performance offends Section 8 (a) (3) because neither is prompted
by employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
However, the presence or absence of discrimination does
not fully resolve the problem of differentiating legal from illegal
employer actions under Section 8 (a) (3). Leading cases show that
some employer actions that constitute discrimination and discourage union membership are not violative of Section 8 (a) (3).
In NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,20 the employer

refused to reinstate striking employees who had been permanently replaced during an economic strike. This was discrimination, since it was adverse treatment of employees caused by the
exercise of their Section 7 right to engage in a concerted activity,
a strike. 21 The effect of this refusal "to reinstate striking employees ...is to discourage employees from exercising their rights to
organize and to strike guaranteed by §§ 7 and 13 of the Act ....,12
Here, the employer's action constituted discrimination that discouraged employees from exercising their right of self-organization. Yet, the Supreme Court held that this action did not violate
Section 8 (a) (3).2
Similarly, in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,24 the employer closed a plant because the

majority of employees voted for union representation, clearly
discrimination. That the effect of this discrimination was to
discourage the employees in this and other plants from exercising
their right to join labor organizations was obvious and was not
questioned. Yet, the Supreme Court held that the employer's
19. See Shieber: Part I. passim, supra note 2.
20. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
21. The fact that the employer would have treated employees who
absented themselves from work for reasons unrelated to exercise of Section
7 rights in the same way does not change the fact that the cause of its
treatment of these employees was their exercise of Section 7 rights and was
therefore "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3). See Republic
Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); and see the discussion of this
point In Shieber: Part I., supra note 2, at 74-76.
22. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 889 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
23. Since Mackay was decided before the 1947 amendments to the
National Labor Relations Act, the opinion refers to Section 8(3) rather
than Section 8(a)(3). Congress did not change the language defining the
unfair labor practice under Section 8(3) when it amended the statute in
1947 and changed the number of the Section to 8(a) (3).
24. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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action was not an unfair labor practice in violation of Section
8 (a) (3).25
We offer the following analysis to explain why the employers'
actions in Mackay and Darlington were not violative of Section
8 (a) (3).
D. A Rationale to Distinguish Prohibitedfrom Permissible
Employer Encouragement or Discouragement
We believe that only employer actions that constitute discrimination and unduly interfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights are Section 8 (a) (3) unfair labor practices. Further,
whether particular discriminatory employer action does or does
not unduly interfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights
can only be determined by weighing the social utility of the
employer's action, its business justification, against its social
disutility, the resulting interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights. When the utility of the action outweighs its
disutility, the discriminatory action is lawful; when the contrary is true, the employer's action is held to "encourage or discourage membership in any labor orgranization" and is thus
an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8 (a) (3).
Some of the elements of utility and disutility can be identified and measured. Identifying these elements is important in
resolving individual cases because it minimizes the possibility
that the Board and courts will base their decisions on unsupported conclusions about the utility of an employer's actions or will
overlook elements of its utility and disutility. An appreciation of
these elements helps us understand why the same employer
action may constitute an unfair labor practice in one set of
circumstances while in other situations it is permissible; for
example, why an employer's denial of reinstatement to unfair
labor practice strikers is an unfair labor practice, while denial of
reinstatement to economic strikers is not.
We believe that the measure of the social utility of an em25. That all employees were adversely treated because some of them
had exercised their Section 7 right of self-organization does not change the
fact that the cause of the employer's treatment of its employees was employee exercise of Section 7 rights and was therefore "discrimination" for
the purposes of Section 8(a)(3). See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162
F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947); and see the discussion of this point In Shieber: Part
I., s&upra note 2, at 71-72.
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ployer's action is the extent to which it tends to enhance management's ability to make an enterprise efficient and profitable.
The measure of the social disutility of the action is the extent
to which it tends to increase (1) employee alarm about adverse
employer treatment resulting from their exercise of Section 7
rights, and (2) the danger that the employer and others will, by
later actions, interfere with employee exercise of those rights.2 6
The decisions relating to employer treatment of employees
who engage in a lawful strike show that the process of weighing
utility and disutility provides a rational basis for distinguishing
between legal and illegal employer conduct. In Mackay,2 the
Court determined that the utility of permitting an employer to
continue its operations by hiring permanent replacements for
economic strikers outweighed the disutility of the interference
with the employees' exercise of the right to conduct an economic
strike. The business justification for continuing operations with
permanent replacements is indeed great. Without the power to
hire permanent replacements, management would be unable to
continue production or would be required to rely on temporary
employees whose efficiency is minimized by the fact that they
have no interest in the long-run success of the enterprise. However, the interference with exercise of employees' Section 7 rights
is also great. The possibility of permanent loss of employment
resulting from his participation in an economic strike must act
as a powerful brake on an employee's readiness to participate in
such a strike.28 But the fact that the weight on each side of the
26. Our analysis follows Bentham in measuring the social disutility of
the employer's discriminatory conduct by the alarm and danger that the
conduct creates. Bentham divides the "mischief" of an act into two categories, "the primary, which is sustained by an assignable Indivdual, or a
multitude of assignable individuals .... [and] the secondary, which taking
its origin from the former, extends itself either over the whole community,
or over some other multitude of unassignable individuals." The secondary
mischief consists of (1) "alarm," which Bentham defines as "a pain of apprehension: a pain grounded on the apprehension of suffering such mischiefs
. . . as it is the nature of the primary mischief to produce" and (2) "danger,"
which "is the chance . . . which the multitude it concerns may in consequence of the primary mischief, stand exposed to, of suffering such mischiefs." J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LsaisLATION 143-44 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds., 1970).
27. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
28. That it does have this effect is evidenced by the fact that employer
pre-election campaigns stress this possibility as one of the dire consequences
of choosing to be represented by a union. See, e.g., Texas Industries, Inc.
v. NLRB, 336 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1964); Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B.
1782 (1962); and C. KOTHE, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM IN THE NoN-UNIoN PLANT 172
(1967).
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balance is heavy does not lessen the necessity of deciding which
is the heavier, and the Mackay Court held that the business justification for continuing operations with permanent replacements
had greater social utility than non-interference with employees'
right to participate in an economic strike.29
The balance is struck differently when the employees are
engaged in an unfair labor practice strike.80 The utility of the
employer's action, the importance of continuing production with
permanent employees, remains, but the disutility of interfering
with the employees' Section 7 right to strike is increased and
now outweighs the business justification. This increase in disutility is due to increased danger that employers will engage in
unfair labor practices. The danger is increased because if employers could permanently replace unfair labor practice strikers,
some employers might decide that it was advantageous for them
to commit unfair labor practices in order to provoke a strike and
thereby secure an opportunity to permanently replace the strikers.81 Thus, there is greater social disutility in denying reinstatement rights to unfair labor practice strikers than to economic
strikers, and the different rules applicable to them are attributable to this difference in disutility.
The balance is also struck differently when an employer
grants superseniority to permanent replacements for economic
strikers, even when necessary to enable "the employer . . . [to]
operat[e] its plant during the strike ... ."82 Since we are con-

cerned here with an employer who grants replacements for
economic strikers superseniority "'SOLELY to protect and continue the business of the employer,' "83 it is clear that the business
justification for the employer's action is exactly the same as the
business justification for simply hiring permanent replacements;
by hypothesis he cannot obtain suitable replacements without
granting superseniority. But the disutility of the employer's
29. A contrary assessment Is made in Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and
the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 Tsx. L. REV. 782 (1972).
30. E.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278 (1956); NLRB v. Milco, Inc., 388
F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 1968); NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d
594 (5th Cir. 1957).
31. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 286-8" (1956); U.S.
Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
32. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 873 U.S. 221, 232 (1963).
33. Id. at 226.
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actions is greater because the adverse effects on employees'
exercising Section 7 rights are increased. Even if reinstated,
strikers are liable to lay-off before their replacements and therefore have more reason to be alarmed about exercise of Section
7 rights. Such increased alarm results in the disutility of the
84
employer's actions outweighing its utility.

Thus, we see that knowledge of the weighing process and of
the measurable elements of social utility and disutility of
employer actions provides a rational basis for distinguishing
between legal and illegal employer discriminatory actions. 85 This
knowledge also provides a rational basis for the decision of future
cases. For example, it provides a means for determining whether
lockouts intended "merely to bring about settlement of a labor
dispute on favorable terms""6 should be held violative of Section
8 (a) (3).
In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,37 the Supreme
Court held that a lockout "solely as a means to bring economic
pressure to bear in support of the employer's bargaining position,
after an impasse has been reached"' 8 was not an unfair labor
practice in violation of Section 8 (a) (3). Although the opinion
contains some broader language,89 the Court expressly limited
its holding to bargaining lockouts "after a bargaining impasse
has been reached"4 0 and "intimate[d] no view whatever as to
the consequences which would follow had the employer replaced
34. This was the explicit basis for the decision in Erie Resistor, holding
the grant of super-seniority to replacements for economic strikers an unfair
labor practice under Section 8(a) (3): "Under the decision in . . . [Mackay]
an employer may operate his plant during a strike and at its conclusion need
not discharge those who worked during the strike in order to make way for
returning strikers. It may be, as the Court of Appeals said, that 'such a
replacement policy is obviously discriminatory and may tend to discourage
union membership.' But Mackay did not deal with super-seniority, with its
effects upon all strikers, whether replaced or not, or with its powerful
impact upon a strike itself. Because the employer's interest must be deemed
to outweigh the damage to concerted activities caused by permanently replacing strikers does not mean it also outweighs the far greater encroachment resulting from super-seniority in addition to permanent replacement."
373 U.S. at 232.
35. Compare Schatzki, The Employer's UnUlateral Act-A Per Be Violation-Bometimes, 44 TEx. L. Rav. 470, 488, 490 (1966); Summers, Labor Law
in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALz L.J. 59, 72-73 (1965).

36. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965).
37. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).

38. Id. at 308.
39. Id. at 313.
40. Id. at 318.
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its employees with permanent replacements or even temporary
4
help." 1
The alarm caused by a post-impasse lockout is that the
employees will suffer a temporary loss of earnings if they exercise their Section 7 right to adhere to the bargaining demands
of their union. In American Ship Building, the Court held, in
effect, that the creation of such alarm did not outweigh the business justification for the employer's action.
What of lockouts in other contexts, e.g., pre-impasse, postimpasse with temporary replacements, and post-impasse with
permanent replacements? The employer's business justification
for all of these lockouts is the same as its business justification
for the post-impasse lockout without replacements, i.e., to obtain
a "bargaining victory, '42 "a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable terms ... ."4 This is certainly of substantial importance
to the efficient operation of an enterprise because of its impact
on competitive position and profitability. Its social utility is
therefore substantial.
What of the employee alarm generated among employees
with respect to their exercise of Section 7 rights in pre-impasse
contexts? Unlike the employer's business justification which
remains the same, the alarm varies with the context. A preimpasse lockout creates alarm about continuing to engage in
collective bargaining once the employer has stated his position.
For if an employer is free to employ a pre-impasse lockout, the
mere fact that negotiations are continuing after the employer
stated its position gives rise to the apprehension that its employees will suffer a temporary loss of earnings if they exercise
their Section 7 rights to continue negotiating about the em4
ployer's proposals instead of accepting them.
The alarm created by a post-impasse lockout combined with
41. Id. at 308 n. 8.
42. Id. at 323 (White, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 313.
44. The Board has held that pre-impasse lockouts are not violative of
Section 8(a)(3). Unfortunately, the Board's decision was not based on any
analysis of the different extents to which pre-impasse and post-impasse
lockouts interfere with the exercise of employee rights that the Act is intended to protect. Instead, the Board based its decision on the verbal formula used by the Court in American Ship Buflding, i.e., that the lockout was
"neither inherently prejudicial to union interests nor devoid of significant
economic justification." See Darling & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom., Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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permanent replacements is even greater. Employees have every
reason to fear permanent loss of their jobs (not just a temporary
loss of earnings) if they exercise their Section 7 rights to adhere
to the bargaining demands made by their union. Further, they
may fear that any bargaining may reach an impasse and empower their employer to permanently replace them.
Somewhere in between is the alarm caused by a post-impasse
lockout with temporary replacements. The employee fears not
only temporary loss of earnings but that the tenure of the temporary replacements may ripen into permanence if the employees
continue to adhere to the bargaining demands made by their
45
union.
This examination of the extent of interference with Section
7 rights resulting from different lockouts indicates that the alarm
resulting from either pre-impasse lockouts or post-impasse lockouts with temporary or permanent replacements exceeds the
alarm created by post-impasse lockouts without replacements.
Hence, the social disutility of the former ones is greater than
that of a post-impasse lockout without replacements. Faced with
pre-impasse lockouts, or post-impasse lockouts coupled with
replacement, whether permanent or temporary, we submit that
the Board should weigh the impact of employee alarm about the
exercise of Section 7 rights in each of these instances against
the employer's business justification in order to determine their
lawfulness under Section 8(a) (3).46
45. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), the Court held that a postimpasse lockout with temporary replacements did not violate Section 8(a) (3).
In that case, the extent of the social utility of the employers' conduct was
Increased since it was measured not only by the business Justification of
obtaining a favorable settlement of a labor dispute, but also by the business
Justification of preserving the integrity of a multi-employer bargaining unit.
The case is therefore not a holding on the lawfulness of a post-impasse
lockout with temporary employee replacements In situations where this
additional business Justification is not present. Such a lockout Is a Section
8(a)(3) unfair labor practice. Inland Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562
(7th Cir. 1971). But cf. Note, 50 Tox L. REV. 552, 558 (1972).

46. Cf. Meltzer, The Lockout Cases, 1965 Sup. Or. REv. 87, 103-05.

This

weighing process has long been applied to determine violations of Section

8(a)(1). See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 92 S. Ct 2238, 2241 (1972);
Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269
(1965) ("[I]t is only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the
business justification for the employer's action that § 8(a)(1) Is violated.");
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945). The significance
of the fact that the same test is used to determine whether employer con-

duct is an undue Interference with exercise of Section 7 rights and therefore
violative of Section 8(a)(1) or an undue discouragement of membership in
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E. The Proposed Rationale and the Prior
Section 8(a) (3) Jurisprudence
The courts have explicitly recognized that the weighing process must be employed in some cases in which a Section 8 (a) (3)
violation is charged. In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,47
Chief Justice Warren, writing for seven members of the Court,
divided employer conduct into two categories. One category contained employer conduct "inherently destructive of employee
interests"; the other, conduct from which "the resulting harm to
employee rights is ... comparatively slight .... ,'4 The Court
made it clear that when employer conduct is in the "inherently
destructive" category and there is "no proof of an antiunion motivation," the weighing process is to be employed. In such cases
"the Board may ... exercise its duty to strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of the Act and its policy" and
could hold such conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (3) .49
However, whether the weighing process is to be used in
cases in the "comparatively slight" category was left unclear,
since the Court said, "if the adverse effect of the discriminatory
conduct on employee rights is 'comparatively slight,' an antiunion motivation must be proved to sustain the charge if the
employer has come forward with evidence of legitimate and sub'
stantial business justifications for the conduct."W
The Court did
not indicate which business justifications are to be considered
"legitimate and substantial."
Does finding that an employer's business justification was
"legitimate and substantial" require a prior determination that
the utility of the employer's actions outweighs its disutility? The
difficulty with an affirmative response is that it eliminates any
reason for distinguishing between the "inherently destructive"
and "comparatively slight" categories because the rules applicable to the two categories become identical. Whether an
employer's discriminatory conduct is categorized as "inherently
any labor organization for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) is discussed in
Section III of this article dealing with the relationship between Section
8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1). See pp. 51-59 infra.
47. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
48. Id. at 33-34.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 34.
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destructive" or "comparatively slight," whenever there is no
proof of employer antiunion animus, its legality under Section
8 (a) (3) would be determined by whether the utility of the business justification for the conduct outweighed the disutility of
the interference with employee rights resulting from the conduct.
The Court apparently adopted an affirmative response in
NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co.,51 when it ignored the distinction
between "inherently destructive" and "comparatively slight"
employer conduct and empowered the Board to employ the
weighing process whenever "the employer's conduct 'could have
adversely affected employee rights to some extent.' "52
In Fleetwood Trailer the employer had hired new employees
instead of reinstating economic strikers after the end of a strike
because no jobs were available on the date that the strikers
applied for reinstatement. When jobs later became available,
the new employees were hired because they had applied for them
before the strikers. The Court said:
"If, after conclusion of the strike, the employer refuses
to reinstate striking employees, the effect is to discourage
employees from exercising their rights to organize and to
strike guaranteed by §§ 7 and 13 of the Act ....
Under §§
8 (a) (1) and (3) . . . it is an unfair labor practice to interfere with the exercise of these rights. Accordingly, unless
the employer who refuses to reinstate strikers can show that
his action was due to 'legitimate and substantial business
justifications,' he is guilty of an unfair labor practice. NLRB
v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34 (1967)."58
The burden of proving justification was placed on the employer,
and the Court held that it is the primary responsibility of the
Board and not of the courts "to strike the proper balance
between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of
5' 4
employee rights in light of the Act and its policy.
This language dispenses with any need to characterize employer conduct that interferes with the exercise of Section 7
51. 389 U.S. 375 (1967).
52. Id. at 380.

53. Id. at 378.
54. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967).
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rights as either "inherently destructive" or "comparatively
slight." In all cases when discriminatory employer conduct interferes with the exercise of Section 7 rights it is an unfair labor
practice under Section 8(a) (3) "unless the employer . . . can
show that his action was due to 'legitimate and substantial business justification'. .. ."5 Whether or not the employer's justification is "legitimate and substantial" is primarily for the Board
to determine by doing what the Court previously in Great Dane
had said the Board was empowered to do only when the employer conduct was "inherently destructive of employee interests"; i.e., by striking the "proper balance between the asserted
business justifications and the invasion of employee rights in
light of the Act and its policy."''
While the Board and the courts of appeal have continued
to be bemused by the "inherently destructive"-"comparatively
slight" dichotomy, 57 Great Dane and Fleetwood Trailers have
been read as authorizing the Board to weigh business justification against interference with employee rights when the employer was not motivated by antiunion animus, even in the
"comparatively slight" situations. Thus, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has said:
"The Court, therefore, has established two categories of
Sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) violations which do not require
proof of antiunion animus. First, employer conduct which is
'inherently destructive' of employee rights is an unfair labor
practice whether or not such conduct was based upon important business considerations. Second, employer conduct
which has only a 'comparatively slight' impact on the rights
of employees will also be held an unfair labor practice unless
the employer comes forward with evidence of 'legitimate
and substantial' reasons to justify his conduct. Perhaps the
most significant part of this test is the Court's requirement
that the reasons advanced be substantial. Apparently, the
55. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967).
56. As for the absence of proof of antiunion motivation, if the "employer
... has not shown 'legitimate and substantial business justifications,' the
conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice without reference to intent."
Id. at 380.
57. See U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co. v. NLRB, 442 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
NLRB v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223 (3d Cir. 1970); Laclede
Gas Co., 187 N.L.I.B. No. 32 (Dec. 14, 1970).
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employer must demonstrate that his interest in pursuing the
conduct at least balances the harm inflicted on the rights of
the employees. Otherwise, the Court will find that an unfair
labor practice has been made out with no proof of an antiunion motive. Only if the employer meets his burden will
the Court require proof of an antiunion animus." 5
Thus, there is substantial authority that in all cases in which
there is no proof of employer antiunion animus, whether in the
"inherently destructive" or "comparatively slight" category, the
weighing process should be used.
We believe that our proposed rationale is equally applicable
to cases in which an employer's conduct is motivated by antiunion animus. Whatever the employer's motive for discriminatory conduct which discourages exercise of Section 7 rights, such
conduct violates Section 8(a) (3) only when it is undue. 59
Whether it is undue or not is determined by whether the social
utility of the business justification for the employer's conduct
(measured by the extent to which it contributes to management's
ability to make the enterprise efficient and profitable) outweighs
the social disutility of the interference with employee exercise
of Section 7 rights (measured by the extent to which the conduct
tends to increase employee alarm about exercise of Section 7
rights and danger of future employer interference). Thus viewed,
employer antiunion animus is neither a "fictive formality" 60 nor
an "added element" that is required to establish a violation of
Section 8 (a) (3).81 It is but one factor to be weighed in the determination of whether a particular discouragement of employee
exercise of Section 7 rights resulting from "discrimination" is
undue and thus violative of Section 8 (a) (3).62
58. Lane v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Accord, Inland
Trucking Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Hudson Transit
Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223 (3d Cir. 1970). (The Court of Appeals in Hudson
Transit used the Great Dane-Fleetwood Trailer analysis in a Section 8(a) (1)
case and upheld the Board's finding "that the adverse impact of the economies clearly outweighed the business justification for the economies
offered by the employer," 429 F.2d at 1232.)

See NLRB v. Alamo Express,

Inc., 430 F.2d 1032, 1036 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Gotham Industries, 406 F.2d
1306 (1st Cir. 1969). In his dissent in Great Dane, Justice Harlan recognized
that the decision might be interpreted in this way. See 388 U.S. at 39.

59. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
60. Cf. Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of
Unfair Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77
YALE L.J. 1269, 1327 (1968).
61. Cf. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
62. Cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 56-57 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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As yet, neither the Board nor the courts have recognized
antiunion animus as only one factor in the weighing process.
Instead, the Supreme Court has said that "the added element of
unlawful intent" is "also required" along with "both discrimination and a resulting discouragement of union membership" under
Section 8 (a) (3) ;68 and that "to find a violation of Section 8 (a) (3)
...the Board must find that the employer acted for a proscribed
purpose"' 4 and that "finding of a violation normally turns on
whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose."6 5 Furthermore, other statements are to the effect
that given discrimination and resulting discouragement, antiunion animus is itself a sufficient basis for finding a violation of
Section 8(a) (3). Indeed, the Court so stated in NLRB v. Brown:
"[W]here, as here, the tendency to discourage union
membership is comparatively slight, and the employers' conduct is reasonably adapted to achieve legitimate business
ends or to deal with business exigencies, we enter into an
area where the improper motivation of the employers must
be established by independent evidence. When so established,
antiunion motivation will convert an otherwise ordinary
business act into an unfair labor practice ..... Erie Resistor
Corp., supra, at 227, and cases there cited.""
Given the importance attached to employer antiunion animus in
these statements, it is hardly surprising that the Board and the
courts have concluded that when an employer discourages membership in a labor organization by discrimination, a violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) is established ipso facto once it is found that
the "employer was actuated by a desire to discourage membership . . . ."6 For example, the Supreme Court in American Ship
Building rested its conclusion that a post-impasse lockout was
not violative of Section 8 (a) (3) on the fact that "the intention
proven [was] merely to bring about a settlement of a labor dispute on favorable terms . . . .,88 It is clear that if the Court had
found "that the employer was actuated by a desire to discourage
63. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965).
64. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965).
65. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
66. 380 U.S. 278, 287-88 (1965) (emphasis added). Of. NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
67. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 313 (1965).
68. Id.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

membership in the union as distinguished from a desire to affect
the outcome of the particular negotiations in which it was
involved,"6 9 it would have held the post-impasse lockout violative of Section 8 (a) (3) without any further inquiry. And, in
one case, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that it need not determine
whether the employer's justification for discriminatory conduct
"would qualify as a 'substantial and legitimate business end,' ..
.
sufficient to defeat an unfair labor practice charge in the absence
of an affirmative showing of improper intent for we hold that
substantial evidence supports the Board's finding of an unlawful
motivation."70 The court assumed that an unfair labor practice
violative of Section 8 (a) (3) had been established solely because
the employer's discriminatory conduct was motivated by antiunion animus.
However, this conclusion and the statements on which it
rests are incorrect. It is clear that the law is to the contrary;
that given both discrimination and discouragement, employer
antiunion animus is not per se a sufficient basis for finding that
discriminatory conduct is violative of Section 8(a) (3). The
Supreme Court so held in Textile Workers Union of America v.
Darlington Manufacturing Co.71
Discrimination and discouragement of employee exercise of
Section 7 rights were both present in Darlington. The employer
permanently terminated all operations at one of its plants
because a majority of the employees in that plant had voted in
a Board election for union representation. The effect was to discourage employees both in that plant and in the employer's other
plants from exercising Section 7 rights in the future. It was
found as a fact that the employer's actions were motivated by
2
antiunion animus7
Assuming first "that Darlington was to be regarded as an
69. rd.

70. NLRB v. Great At. & Pao. Tea Co., Inc., 409 F.2d 296, 298 (5th Cir.
1969) (emphasis added).
71. 380 U.S. 263 (1965). See U.S. Stamping Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 172, 186 (1938):
"We believe the evidence clearly establishes the fact that Riggs and Bane
were relieved of their duties as watchmen because the respondent feared
they were too sympathetic towards the Union's cause to be trustworthy
watchmen. However, we do not believe an employer, who during a strike
relieves a watchman from his duties as such for this reason, has engaged
In an unfair labor practice within the meaning of § 8(3) of the Act."
72. 380 U.S. at 276.
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independent unrelated employer," 78 the Court held "that when
an employer closes his entire business, even if the liquidation is
motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such action is
not an unfair labor practice."7 4 It is therefore clear that in the
case of complete liquidation of a business, antiunion animus is
not sufficient of itself to make that act an unfair labor practice
under Section 8(a) (3).
We believe that the actual (though unstated) basis for the
Court's ruling was its conclusion that the social utility of an
employer's power to liquidate its business, even if motivated by
a desire to destroy its employees' Section 7 rights outweighs the
social disutility of interfering with employee exercise of Section
7 rights. This belief is based on the apparent respect with which
the Court viewed an employer's power to completely liquidate
its business and the sheer inadequacy of the Court's stated reasons for its ruling.
The Court's high opinion of this management power is evidenced by the fact that even a partial closing was viewed by
the Court as "an area that trenches so closely upon otherwise
legitimate employer prerogatives" that protection of the rights
guaranteed by the Act to the employees against whom the discrimination was practiced was made to depend on the employer's
motive with respect to exercise of Section 7 rights by other
employees.7 5 It is also apparent from the Court's statement that:
"A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to
go out of business if he wants to would represent such a
startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Relations Act."7 6
Thus, the Court considered the "innovation" so "startling" that
although it explicitly recognized that an employer's decision "to
terminate his business ...
if discriminatorily motivated, is
encompassed within the literal language of § 8(a) (3),"7 it still
required "the clearest manifestation of legislative intent'"78 to find
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 270.
at 273-74.
at 276.
at 270.
at 269.
at 270.
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it violative of that section. In so doing, the Court inverted the
usual process of statutory interpretation that requires legislative
history to show "'that a thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit nor within the intention of its makers.' "
And, the inadequacy of the stated reasons for the Court's
decision is obvious upon an examination of those reasons. First,
the Court relied on the fact that it could not find the "clearest
manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent '" to support a ruling that the total shutdown of a business
motivated by antiunion animus and resulting in discouragement
of employee exercise of Section 7 rights was violative of Section
8(a) (3). As shown above, given the admitted fact that such
discriminatory action was "within the literal language of §
8(a) (3)," accepted canons of statutory interpretation required
that if it was to be excepted from proscription by that section,
legislative history showing that it was "not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers"8 1 was required. No such showing was even attempted.82

79. See National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619
(1967) (quoting from Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,
459 (1892)); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184, 217 (1967).
The criticism that Justice Harlan directed at the Court in dissenting from
its decision in another case is at least as applicable here: "In the light of
these assertions, it is indeed remarkable that the Court not only substantially acknowledges that the statutory language does not itself support
this distinction . . . but cites no report of Congress, no statement of a
legislator, not even the view of any of the many commentators in the area
in any way casting doubt on the applicability of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to picketing of the kind involved here." NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local
760, 377 U.S. 58, 83-84 (1964).
80. Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 880 U.S.
263, 270 (1965).
81. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 619 (1967).
82. There is some legislative history supporting the Court's holding that
a discriminatory total shutdown of a business is not an unfair labor practice.
During the Senate debate on the Wagner Act, Senator Walsh, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on Education & Labor and floor manager of the
bill, said: "Mr. President, there are some fundamental rights an employer
has, just as there are rights an employee has. No one can compel an employer to keep his factory open. ...
"No one can keep an employer from closing down his factory and putting
thousands of men and women on the street. So in dealing with this bill we
have to recognize those fundamental things, and we have not gone into
that domain. All we do is to remove the barriers that have kept employees
away from their employers, which have prevented collective bargaining,
which have resulted in strikes without any attempt to negotiate. All we
have done is to promote the orderly processes of collective bargaining."
79 CoNe. REc. 7673 (1935).
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Second, the Court distinguished the discriminatory total
shutdown of a business from admittedly unlawful employer conduct like a runaway shop on the ground that "a complete liquidation of a business yields no... future benefit for the employer
.... "88 Without such a future benefit, the Court indicated that:
"The personal satisfaction that such an employer may derive
from standing on his beliefs and the mere possibility that
other employers will follow his example are surely too
remote to be considered dangers at which the labor statutes
84
were aimed.
This argument lacks substance. Remote or not, when a discriminatory total shutdown of a business occurs, it is a massive
affront to the declared:
"[P]olicy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce
S.. when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing .... 85
Indeed, the Court itself recognized the invalidity of the
argument of remoteness when, in a footnote to its "surely too
remote" sentence, it indicated that an unfair labor practice would
be made out in an even more remote situation by saying, "different considerations would arise were it made to appear that
the closing employer was acting pursuant to some arrangement
or understanding with other employers to discourage employee
organizational activities in their businesses."86
In any event, an employer can expect future benefit from a
discriminatory total shutdown in the form of a highly effective
deterrent to employee exercise of Section 7 rights in any enterprise he may thereafter control. Furthermore, the Court's holding
that such a shutdown is not an unfair labor practice creates the
far from remote possibility that the stated policies of the Act
83. Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S.
263, 272 (1965).
84. 1d.
85. Section 1 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
86. 380 U.S. at 272 n. 15 (emphasis added).
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will be frustrated by employer threats to employees that they
will lose their livelihoods if they exercise the rights guaranteed
them by the Act. The Court states that such threats in the compelling form of an employer's "announcing a decision to close
already reached by the board of directors or other management
authority empowered to make such a decision" are a lawful
means to "discourage the employees from voting for the union,
and thus his decision may not have to be implemented. 8 7 Ironically, the threat to close a plant that is made in a less compelling
form continues to be "a basic violation of § 8 (a) (1) ."s Finally,
the fallacious argument that because the Act does not prohibit
"employees to quit their employment en masse, even if motivated by a desire to ruin the employer," "[the employer's right
to go out of business is no different,""" requires only the obvious
answer that the fact that the Act does not prohibit all conceivable employee acts damaging to an employer or, for that matter,
all conceivable employer acts damaging to employees, is totally
irrelevant to the issue of whether it does prohibit the specific
employer act of a discriminatory total shutdown.
We therefore believe that rather than these inadequate stated
reasons for the Court's decision in the Darlington case, the real
basis for that decision was the great importance that the Court
attached to management's power to completely liquidate a business. Apparently, the Court decided that the utility of this management power outweighed its disutility even when motivated by
a desire to discourage employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
Thus, Darlington is authority for the proposition that even
when employer discriminatory conduct that discourages employee exercise of Section 7 rights is motivated by antiunion
animus, it is violative of Section 8 (a) (3) only when the discouragement is undue, i.e., when the disutility outweighs the utility."
As we have seen, the same test is used to determine whether
employer discriminatory conduct that is not motivated by antiunion animus is violative of Section 8 (a) (3). It is therefore our
belief that, irrespective of employer antiunion animus, whether
discriminatory conduct that discourages employee exercise of
87. Id. at 274 n. 20.

88. NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., Inc., 406 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir.
1969).

89. 880 U.S. at 272.
90. See U.S. Stamping Co., note 71 8upra.
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Section 7 rights is violative of Section 8 (a) (3) is determined by
weighing the social utility of the conduct against its social disutility.
But this does not mean that employer antiunion animus is
inconsequential. On the contrary, in this weighing process employer antiunion animus is of great significance. When an employer is motivated by antiunion animus, the danger of interference with and the alarm that employees will feel about the
exercise of Section 7 rights is always increased.9 1 When an
employer is thus motivated, the danger and alarm extend not
only to the particular mode of exercising Section 7 rights that
caused the employer to treat its employees adversely but to any
exercise of Section 7 rights. The fact that the employer was
motivated by antiunion animus puts employees on notice that
the particular mode of exercising Section 7 rights that caused
their employer to treat them adversely was merely the occasion
for the adverse treatment. Since the employer is motivated by
antiunion animus, any exercise of Section 7 rights is just as
likely to provide it with an equally appropriate occasion. Thus,
when an employer's discriminatory conduct is motivated by antiunion animus, employee alarm about exercise of Section 7 rights
and the interference with exercise of those rights, extends to
any exercise of Section 7 rights.
Although we are not able to subject alarm to precise measurement, there is a clearly perceptible quantitative difference
in the extent of alarm about exercise of Section 7 rights experienced by employees when their employer's discriminatory conduct is motivated by antiunion animus and when it is not. For
example, the alarm experienced by the employees affected by
the employer's discriminatory conduct in Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 92 in which the employer was not motivated by antiunion animus, was less than the alarm experienced by the
employees affected by the employer's discriminatory conduct in
the J. P. Stevens v. NLRB cases,9 8 in which the employer was
91. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCULES O MORALS AND
LEoisLATioN 155-56 (J.H. Burns & H.I.A. Hart eds., 1970).
92. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
93. 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), modified and enforced, 880 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389, U.S. 1005 (1967); 163 N.L.R.B. 217 (1967), modifed
and enforced, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968); 167
N.L.R.B. 266 (1967) and 167 N.L.R.B. 258 (1967), modified and enforced, 406
F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1968); 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d 583

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

motivated by antiunion animus. For, while the Republic Aviation employees had reason to be alarmed only about union solicitation on plant premises during free time, those of J. P. Stevens
& Co. had reason to be alarmed about any indication of interest
in self-organization by themselves or even by members of their
4
9

families.

Since "discrimination" accompanied by antiunion animus
results in danger of interference with and employee alarm about
any exercise of Section 7 rights, in almost all cases its presence
is sufficient to make the disutility of the employer's conduct outweigh its utility. Indeed, the effect of employer antiunion animus
is so great that it will cause the disutility to outweigh the utility
even when the balance would have been struck differently if the
employer had not been motivated by antiunion animus. 95 For
example, an employer that is not motivated by antiunion animus
may lawfully deny to its employees a productivity bonus even if
that denial is caused by the employees having engaged in an
economic strike which caused the employees' reduced productivity. Such a denial is "discrimination" since it is employer adverse
treatment of employees caused by employee exercise of a Section
7 right, the right to strike. But if the same denial caused by the
same economic strike was motivated by antiunion animus, it is an
unfair labor practice violative of Section 8 (a) (3).96 Similarly,
the Court has indicated that even an employer's right to hire per(5th Cir. 1969); 177 N.L.R.B. 944 (1969), enforced in part, 431 F.2d 900 (4th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911 (1971); 179 N.L.R.B. 254 (1969), enforced,
441 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 69 (1971); 183 N.L.R.B. No.
5 (June 5, 1970), enforced, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972).
94 See the treatment accorded Jess Cudd because of his son's union
activities. See 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 905-07 and 380 F.2d 292.
95. Wells, Inc. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1947). In this case, the
employer's discharge of a supervisor was held to be violative of Section
8(a)(3) solely because the employer was motivated by antiunion animus.
Both the Board and the court recognized that the social disutility of a discharge for this reason was the alarm that it caused other employees to
feel about the exercise of Section 7 rights. Thus, in upholding the Board's
finding that the motive for the discharge was "an attitude of hostility of
Wells' part toward the organizational activities of the Machinists," the
court quoted the following from the Board's decision: "That a discharge of
an active adherent of a union under circumstances which suggest no motivation other than hostility to the union, operates as a warning to all employees of the danger attached to adherence to the union, hence generally
discourages union membership, can not be denied." 162 F.2d at 459. See
NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964); J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 461 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1972).
96. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. NLRB, 284 F.2d 74 (9th Cir. 1960);
cf. Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
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manent replacements for economic strikers depends on "absence
of proof of unlawful motivation."9 7
F. The Proposed Rationale Assures Optimal Achievement
of Congressional Intent
The following discussion of Section 8(a) (3) appears in the
House Report:
"Nothing in this subsection prohibits [permits?] interference with the normal exercise of the right of employers to
select their employees or to discharge them. All that is
intended is that the employer shall not by discriminatory
treatment in hire or tenure of employment or terms or conditions of employment, interfere with the exercise by employees of their right to organize and choose representatives.
It is for this reason that the employer is prohibited from
encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization by such discrimination. ' "
This reveals two Congressional purposes: to prevent employers
from "interfer[ing] with the exercise by employees of their
right to organize and choose representatives," but also to avoid
undue restriction of employers' powers to manage their enterprises" shown by the express disclaimer of any intent to interfere "with the normal exercise of the right of employers to select
their employees or to discharge them."'100 In Phelps Dodge Corp.
97. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965). It appears that the
Board would not ascribe such significance to an employer's "unlawful
motivation" in hiring permanent replacements for economic strikers. See
Hot Shoppes, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 802 (1964). In its 29th Annual Report, the
Board stated that in Hot Shoppes, "the Board disagreed with the premise
that an employer may replace economic strikers only if it is shown that he
acted to preserve efficient operation of his business." In arriving at its
conclusion, the Board construed the Supreme Court's decision in Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co., and cases thereafter, as holding that "the motive for
such replacements is immaterial, absent evidence of an independent unlawful purpose." 29 NLRB ANN. REP. 72 (1965) (emphasis added).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1935), 2 1935 LEG. IsT.
3069.
99. Cf. Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers, Local No. 3, 325 U.S.
797, 806 (1945).
100. See text at note 98 supra. A similar disclaimer is contained in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937). The same concern
about the importance of not unduly restricting management powers appears
in the legislative history of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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v. NLRB 1' 1 and American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 10 2 the
Court gave explicit recognition to this purpose when it said:
"Protection of the workers' right to self-organization does
not curtail the appropriate sphere of managerial freedom; it
furthers the wholesome conduct of business enterprise." 1 3
And:
"[W]e have consistently construed the section to leave
unscathed a wide range of employer actions taken to serve
legitimate business interests in some significant fashion, even
though the act committed may tend to discourage union
membership. See, e.g., .. . Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,

304 U.S. 333, 347. Such a construction of § 8 (a) (3) is essential if due protection is to be accorded the employer's right
to manage his enterprise. See Textile Workers v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., ante, p. 263."1o4
In order to achieve both Congressional purposes, the second
-avoidance of undue restriction of employers' powers to manage
their enterprises-must act as a limiting qualification on the first
-prevention of employer interference with employee exercise
of Section 7 rights. This requires a determination of when outlawing employer conduct that interferes with employee exercise of Section 7 rights will result in an undue restriction on
employer management power. Such a determination is to be
made only by weighing the societal value of preventing the interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights resulting from
the employer conduct against the importance to society of avoiding the restriction on employer management power that would
result if that conduct were outlawed, i.e., by use of the weighing
process described herein.
To neglect using the weighing process ignores the purposes
that Congress sought to achieve in enacting Section 8 (a) (3). To
substitute other considerations, e.g., presence of antiunion animus, for the weighing process must serve purposes other than
those Congress intended to further. Neither Constitutional
101.
102.
103.
104.

313 U.S. 177 (1944).
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 182 (1941).
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 880 U.S. 800, 311 (1965).
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requirements0 5 nor other Congressional priorities' 0 6 justify any
such disregard for achieving the purposes of Section 8(a) (3)prevention of employer interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights and avoidance of undue restriction on employers'
management powers.
The weighing process is the only means to carry out the policies Congress sought to achieve when it enacted Section 8 (a) (3).
When the weighing process is used, employer discriminatory conduct is held to violate Section 8 (a) (3) if it constitutes "discrimination," and such discrimination results in undue "encourage[ment] or discourage [ment] of membership in a labor organization." Inquiry into whether an employer was motivated by
antiunion animus is not required. If the employer was so motivated, its antiunion animus is but one factor to be weighed. Thus,
whether an employer was motivated by antiunion animus or not,
use of the weighing process assures optimal achievement of the
congressional purposes, because employer conduct is held to violate Section 8 (a) (3) only when the social disutility of the interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights outweighs the
social utility of the business justification for the employer's conduct.1m
G. Importance of Using the Weighing Process
On the whole, had the weighing process been avowedly used
in the decisions construing Section 8 (a) (3), the results would
not differ from those reached in the cases. We saw this in
analyzing the rules dealing with employer treatment of employees who participate in strikes.108
Indeed, at times, the Supreme Court has stated that the
weighing process should be employed in deciding whether employer conduct violates Section 8(a) (3). For example:
"If the conduct in question falls within this 'inherently
destructive' category, the employer has the burden of explaining away, justifying or characterizing 'his actions as
105. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76
(1964) (Black, J., concurring).
106. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local No. 770, 398 U.S. 235
(1970).
107. Of. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
108. See pp. 8-10 8upra.
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something different than they appear on their face,' and if
he fails, 'an unfair labor practice charge is made out.' Id.,
[Erie Resistor] at 228. And even if the employer does come
forward with counter explanations for his conduct in this
situation, the Board may nevertheless draw an inference of
improper motive from the conduct itself and exercise its duty
to strike the proper balance between the asserted business
justifications and the invasion of employee rights in light of
the Act and its policy. Id., at 229."109
But the Court has insisted that antiunion animus also be
found. Thus, in NLRB v. Brown, the Court said:
"Under that section [8(a) (3)] both discrimination and a
resulting discouragement of union membership are necessary, but the added element of unlawful intent is also required....

The discriminatory act is not by itself unlawful

unless intended to prejudice the employees' position because
of their membership in the union; some element of antiunion
animus is necessary." 110
Even in Great Dane, in which the Court stated that the
weighing process is to be used in the "inherently destructive"
category when the employer succeeds in proving that he was not
in fact motivated by antiunion animus, the Board must apparently "nevertheless draw an inference of improper motive from
the conduct itself
....
"I' before using the weighing process.
Similarly, in NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., the Court stated that
the employer's intent or motive to discriminate or to interfere
112
with union rights was "necessary for an unfair labor practice,"
and indicated that the weighing process was a means of deducing
such employer "intent ... founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself.'" 8
As is to be expected, the Board formulation follows the
Court. The Board states:
"Section 8(a) (3) prohibits an employer from discriminating
against employees 'in regard to hire or tenure of employment
109. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967). Accord,
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 228-29 (1963).
110. 380 U.S. 278, 286 (1965) (emphasis added).
111. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
112. 373 U.S. at 227.
113. Id. at 228.
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or any term or condition of employment' for the purpose of
encouraging or discouraging membership in any labor organization."114
Regardless of the similarity of results in most cases, with or
without explicit use of the weighing process, certain undesirable
consequences result from the formulations that state that employer antiunion animus is an element of a Section 8 (a) (3) violation. One is the necessity of a legal fiction; another is the use
of a basis for decision that is not rationally related to the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3).
The need, in some cases, for a legal fiction of employer antiunion animus was exemplified in Erie Resistor and approved in
Great Dane. Erie Resistor held that the grant of superseniority
to replacements for economic strikers violates Section 8(a) (3)
even if the employer acts without antiunion animus and "'SOLELY to protect and continue'" its business during an economic
strike."" The Board and Court also held that an employer who
grants superseniority to replacements for economic strikers may
not introduce evidence that it was not motivated by antiunion
animus. Despite these holdings, the Court stated that antiunion
animus was a required element of a Section 8 (a) (3) unfair labor
practice. It found this element, "intent or motive to discriminate
or to interfere with union rights," present saying that it could
be "founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive
nature of the conduct itself." 1 In Great Dane, the Court indicated that when an employer's discriminatory conduct fell within
a category of "inherently destructive," there was nothing the
114. See, e.g., 34 NLRB ANN. REP. 74 (1970) (emphasis added). One must
go back to the 14th Annual Report for fiscal 1949 to find an Annual Report
formulation of the prohibition of Section 8(a) (3) that avoids indicating that

employer antiunion animus is an element of the violation. 14 NLRB ANN.
REP. 59 (1949) reads: "Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as amended makes it an

unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage member-

ship in any labor organization by discriminating in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment."
115. 373 U.S. 221, 226.
116. Id. at 227, 228. In American Ship Building the fiction is carried to
the point of denying the facts upon which the holding in Erie Resistor was
based. The case was based on an assumption that the employer's purpose
was not antiunion animus and that this fact did not prevent its conduct
from being violative of Section 8(a) (3). Nevertheless, the Court in American
Ship Building cites Erie Resistor as a case in which "an inference of unlawful intention (is) so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the
employer's protestations of innocent purpose." 380 U.S. at 311-12.
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employer could do to avoid a finding of antiunion animus: "Even
if the employer does come forward with counter explanations for
his conduct in this situation, the Board may nevertheless draw
an inference of improper motive from the conduct itself . ...,117
Thus by operation of a fiction, antiunion animus is held to be
present even if the employer proves its absence or is precluded
118
from offering such proof.
As with any other fiction, this leads to disrespect for the law
and the agencies that enforce it, since persons are held to have
violated the law on the basis of facts which do not exist or which
are presumed to exist without their being given an opportunity
to disprove them.119
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not as yet provided a
test for distinguishing, in advance, those cases in which the fiction is to be employed, from those in which it is not. Does the
fiction apply to a pre-impasse lockout or to a case involving a
post-impasse lockout with hiring of permanent replacements?
To say that the fiction applies if the employer's conduct is "inherently destructive of employee interests"'
explains nothing
because all discriminatory employer conduct that discourages
employee exercise of Section 7 rights is "inherently destructive
of employee interests," yet the fiction is not applied in all cases
in which such conduct is proven. Even if we interpret "inherently destructive of employee interests" as meaning creating
"serious" interferences with employee exercise of Section 7
rights, there is still no reliable basis for applying the fiction.
Permanent replacement of economic strikers creates a "serious"
interference with employee exercise of the Section 7 right to
strike, yet, the fiction is not applied to such circumstances. M
117. 388 U.S. at 33.
118. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967). See also
Justice Black's dissent in Radio Officers': "[Hiere there is no finding that
Gaynor acted in order to encourage union membership. Indeed, the Board
concedes that Gaynor had no such purpose, and this concession is fully

supported by the evidence." 347 U.S. at 58.
119. See 7 J. BENTHAM, WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 283-87 (Bowring ed.
1843), reprinted in C. OGDEN, BENTHAM'S THEORY OF FICTIONS 141-50 (1932);

NLRB v. Wisconsin Aluminum Foundry Co., Inc., 440 F.2d 393, 402 (7th Cir.
1971).

120. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
121. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379 (1967); NLRB
v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 232 (1963); see NLRB v. Mackay Radio
& Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Contra, Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and
the Myth of Business Necessity, 50 Trx. L. Rmv. 782, 783-85, 795-97 (1972).
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Thus, the availability of fictional employer antiunion animus
when there is in fact no such animus, contributes to uncertainty
of when employer conduct will be held violative of Section

8 (a) (3).
Failure to use the weighing process also causes the courts
and the Board to disregard the Congressional intent behind Section 8 (a) (3). For example, in American Ship Building, once the
Supreme Court decided that a post-impasse lockout did not have
"the natural tendency . . . severely to discourage union membership while serving no significant employer interest,"1 22 it made
no effort to determine what holding on the legality of postimpasse lockouts would best achieve the purposes of Section
8(a) (3). Instead, the Court held that the legality of a postimpasse lockout hinged on whether "an intention to discourage
union membership or otherwise discriminate against the union,"
i.e., antiunion animus, was present, and concluded that where it
was not present a post-impasse lockout was not violative of Section 8(a) (3) .128 The Court did not indicate in what way the
presence or absence of antiunion animus related to the purposes
of Section 8 (a) (3). Similarly, in Darling & Co.,124 a Board majority held that having found that a pre-impasse lockout was
"neither inherently prejudicial to union interests nor devoid of
significant economic justification," the legality of such conduct
depended upon whether the employer intended "to discourage
union activity or to avoid its bargaining obligation."'12 5 Again, no
effort was made to square this holding with the purpose of Section 8 (a) (3),126 nor was any indication given of how employer
animus was relevant to achieving the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3)
when an employer engaged in a pre-impasse lockout.
In cases involving a partial shutdown motivated by antiunion animus, this neglect of the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3)
(prevention of employer interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights and avoidance of undue restrictions on employer
122. 380 U.S. 300, 312.
123. Id. at 313.
124. 171 N.L.R.B. 801 (1968), enforced on other grounds, sub nom. Lane
v. NLRB, 418 F.2d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
125. 171 N.L.R.B. at 803.
126. Id. The court of appeals enforced the Board's order, 418 F.2d 1208
(D.C. Cir. 1969). The court, using the weighing process, concluded that under
the circumstances of this case the employer's business justification for the
pre-impasse lockout outweighed the interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights caused by it. See 418 F.2d at 1212.
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management power) has resulted in a rule which is not rationally related to achieving those purposes and which has had
tragic consequences on employees who attempt to exercise the
right to self-organization guaranteed them by the Act.127 Darlington'2 , involved both a partial and a total shutdown of a
business. Regarding a total shutdown, we earlier concluded that
the actual though unstated basis for the Court's decision was its
conclusion that the social utility of the employer's power to completely liquidate a business outweighed the social disutility of the
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights resulting
from the exercise of this employer power even when the employer was motivated by antiunion animus. 29 Though this decision has been questioned,5 0 it is clear that it relates to the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3). The social utility of the employer's
power is measured by the extent to which it contributes to management's ability to make the enterprise efficient and profitable.
In this case it is very great. An employer decision to completely
liquidate a business denotes that the employer is no longer interested in investing its capital and its management efforts in the
enterprise. Without such interest there is no incentive for management to exercise its abilities to make the enterprise either
efficient or profitable. However, the disutility of the interference
resulting from this decision, particularly when motivated by
antiunion animus, it also substantial. This is measured by the
danger that other employers will act similarly and by the alarm
that employees will tend to feel about any exercise of Section 7
rights at that time or in the future. That alarm is somewhat
reduced by the realization that for the employer to act on its
decision will probably entail financial sacrifice that may well be
substantial. And this factor of financial sacrifice reduces both
the danger that other employers will pursue the same course of
action and the alarm that employees of other employers are
likely to experience on learning of the employer's decision. In
determining that the social utility of the employer's power to
entirely shut down outweighed the social disutility of the inter127. See, e.g., Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Inc., 177 N.L.R.B. 591
(1969); modifying after remand, 148 N.L.R.B. 139 (1964); enforced in part,
431 F.2d 254 (8th Cir. 1970); Motor Repair, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1968).

128. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
129. See pp. 18-22 supra.
130. See Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALn
L.J. 59, 65, 67 (1965). The Darlington total shutdown holding was approved
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
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ference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights, the Court's
decision relates to the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) by resolving
the tension between protection of employee exercise of Section 7
rights and prevention of undue interference with the employer
management powers in favor of management powers. Indeed,
legislative history indicates that this resolution of the tension
may well be in accord with Congressional intent. 181
However, analysis of the Court's decision as to the legality
of a partial shutdown of a business motivated by antiunion animus indicates that it does not serve the purposes of Section
8(a) (3) and, indeed, is not even rationally related to achieving
those purposes. Let us use the weighing process again. The social
utility of the employer's power continues to be very great. It is
not as great as that of the total shutdown power because the
employer is willing to continue to invest in the other parts of
the enterprise and is therefore interested in making those other
parts efficient and profitable. This should influence its actions
with respect to operation of the part of the business that it
decided to close. But even assuming that the social utility of
the employer's partial shutdown power is equal to that of a total
shutdown, the social disutility where the partial shutdown is
motivated by antiunion animus far exceeds the social disutility
of a total shutdown. In the partial shutdown situation the alarm
and danger are not reduced by the realization that the shutdown
will entail financial sacrifice to the employer. The employer, its
employees, and other employers and their employees realize that
instead of financial sacrifice, a partial shutdown of operations
motivated by antiunion animus may well result in a financial
benefit to the employer since employees in other parts of the
employer's enterprise will be deterred from exercising their Secto exercise
tion 7 rights on learning of their employer's response
13 2
of Section 7 rights in one part of its enterprise.
131. See the statement of Senator Walsh quoted at note 82 supra,
132. This financial benefit was probably realized by the employer in the
Darlington case since the total number of hourly paid employees employed
by the employer in 25 mills located in three southern states was more than
14,000. Assuming a 40-hour workweek, a 50-week workyear and a saving
of five cents per hour per employee in those 25 mills for the 13 years from
the shutdown of the Darlington plant in 1956 to the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in 1969, the total labor cost saving to Deerings Milliken attributable to its deterring unionization of those employees amounts to
$18,200,000. It is doubtful that the loss (including backpay to the employees)
sustained from the closing of the Darlington plant, where 553 employees had
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The Supreme Court, apparently realizing this difference,
fashioned a different rule for a partial shutdown. The Court held
"that a partial closing is an unfair labor practice under §
8 (a) (3) if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any
of the remaining plants of the single employer and if the
employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing
would likely have that effect."'' 8
The facts that the employer was motivated by a desire to discourage the exercise of Section 7 rights by its employees in the
closed plant and that its employees in its other plants knew that
the closing was so motivated were held to be insufficient, and
employer motive to discourage exercise of Section 7 rights by the
employees in the other plants was held to be essential. 8 4 This
requirement was imposed by reason of the Court's formulation
of the elements of a Section 8(a) (3) violation as "generally"
requiring "a showing of motivation which is aimed at achieving
the prohibited effect" "of discouraging concerted activities." The
Court said:
"Thus, the Board's findings as to the purpose and foreseeable effect of the Darlington closing pertained only to its
impact on the Darlington employees. No findings were made
as to the purpose and effect of the closing with respect to
the employees in the other plants comprising the Deering
Milliken group. It does not suffice to establish the unfair
labor practice charged here to argue that the Darlington closing necessarily had an adverse impact upon unionization in
such other plants. We have heretofore observed that employer action which has a foreseeable consequence of discouraging concerted activities generally does not amount to
a violation of § 8(a) (3) in the absence of a showing of
motivation which is aimed at achieving the prohibited effect.
... In an area which trenches so closely upon otherwise
been employed, approached this figure. See 165 N.L.R.B. 1075-76 (1967) and
34 NLRB ANN. REP. 10 (1970) (Total backpay distributed to 6,225 employees
by the Board in 1969 amounted to $4,370,430.). As of August 29, 1972, the
amount of backpay due the 553 Darlington discriminatees had not been
determined by the Board. See letters from W. Britton Smith, Jr., Attorney,
Region 11, NLRB to B. M. Shieber, September 1, 1971, and from Charles
M. Williamson, Attorney, Region 11, NLRB to B. M. Shieber, August 29,
1972, on file in Louisiana Law Review office.
133. 380 U.S. 263, 275.
134. Id. at 276.
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legitimate employer prerogatives, we consider the absence of
Board findings on this score a fatal defect in its decision."' 85
It is the requirement of proving that the employer was motivated by antiunion animus directed at the employees in its other
plants which bears no rational relationship to achieving the purposes of Section 8 (a) (3). Neither the social utility of the employer partial shutdown power nor the social disutility of the
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights is increased if the employer is thus motivated. If the employer states
that his antiunion animus is directed only at the exercise of
Section 7 rights in the closed plant, the employees' alarm is the
same whether they work in the closed plant or in the plants
continuing in operation. To say that the alarm of the employees
in the other plants is lessened by this statement, is to believe
that they are not intelligent enough to know that their turn
will come when and if they exercise Section 7 rights.a
If, as the Darlington Court held, the social disutility of the
interference outweighed the social utility of the employer
power when the employer was motivated by antiunion animus
directed at the employees in the plants that it had decided to
keep operating, there is no reason, insofar as achieving the
purposes of the Section 8(a) (3) is concerned, for it to have
held that the social disutility did not outweigh the social utility
of the employer power when the employer was motivated by
antiunion animus solely directed at the employees in the plant
it had decided to close. If it is not an undue interference with
management power to hold a partial shutdown a violation of
Section 8(a) (3) when the antiunion animus is proven to extend
to employees in other plants, it is not an undue interference
with management power to hold that a partial shutdown violates
Section 8(a) (3) when the employer is proven to have been
motivated by antiunion animus directed only at the employees
in the plant to be closed.
135. Id.
136. Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, Ino., 177 N.L.R.B. 591 (1969)
illustrates an employer's use of this tactic. In that case the Board held
that an employer may make the closing threat explicit to the employees, if
it does so after the other part of the business was closed. Such statements
according to the Board are "no more than attempts to take advantage of
the closing to persuade employees at the Mobile cafeteria to resist the
organizational activities of the Union." Id. at 598.
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Thus, the Court's insistence on a formulation that identifies
employer antiunion animus as an essential element of a Section
8 (a) (3) violation and its failure to explicitly adopt the weighing
process as the means for determining when a violation of that
section has occurred are important. They have resulted in decisions in which achievement of the Congressional purposes in
enacting Section 8 (a) (3) were neglected and even thwarted by
the need to satisfy the requirements of the formulation's antiunion animus element.18 7 The weighing process should be explicitly adopted as the method for determining when a violation
of Section 8 (a) (3) has occurred in order to correct prior neglect
of the purposes of Section 8(a) (3), including overruling the
Darlington partial closing rule, and to assure that such neglect
will not occur in the future.
It may be argued that the Board and the courts do not have
the ability to use the weighing process to determine the legality
of all discriminatory employer conduct that interferes with employee exercise of Section 7 rights. This argument is easily
refuted. First, weighing the social utility of the employer's conduct against the social disutility of the interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights is required in all Section 8 (a) (1)
cases. 13 If it is not beyond the abilities of the Board and courts
in cases involving Section 8 (a) (1), there is no reason to believe
it to be beyond their abilities in cases involving Section 8 (a) (3).
Second, since the Board is capable of exercising primary responsibility to strike the balance between the conflicting policies in
Section 8 (a) (3) cases involving employer conduct that is "inherently dangerous" to employee exercise of Section 7 rights,3 9
surely the Board is not incapable of striking that balance in the
137. The Board's decision in Morrison Cafeterias Consolidated, INo., 177
N.L.R.B. 591 (1969), illustrates how the Darlington partial shutdown rule
thwarts achievement of the Congressional purposes. When the case was
first decided by the Board in 1964, the Board's order included effective
remedies that would protect employee exercise of Section 7 rights and deter
employers from engaging in discriminatory partial shutdowns motivated
by antiunion animus. The Board's order after the remand caused by the
Darlingtonpartial shutdown rule replaces those remedies with ones that do
not protect employee exercise of Section 7 rights since they are ineffective
to deter employer Interference with employee exercise of those rights. Comnpare 148 N.L.R.B. 148-49 (1964) with 177 N.L.R.B. 591 (1969).
138. E.g., Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 92 S. Ct. 2238 (1972); Textile
Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965);
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962).
139. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
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lesser cases where the employer's conduct has only a "comparatively slight" adverse effect on employee exercise of Section
7 rights. Third, since the Board and the courts are capable of
striking the balance when employers are not motivated by
antiunion animus, 140 there is no reason to believe that they will
not be able to strike the balance when employers are motivated
by antiunion animus, which is merely one factor that increases
14
the social disutility of the employer's conduct. '
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EMPLOYER
MoTIVE IN SECnON 8 (a) (3) CASES

In Section I of this article, we clarified the significance of
employer antiunion animus in determining whether the employer's conduct unduly "encourage[d] or discourage[d] membership in any labor organization." We will now endeavor to
fully assess the significance of employer motive in Section
8(a) (3) cases.
The word "motive" has two principal meanings: (1)"the
consideration or object influencing a choice or prompting an
action" and (2)"something within a person ... that incites him
to action."' In their determinations whether employer conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (3),
the Board and the courts have been concerned with both of
140. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967); NLRB v. Great
Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
141. The weighing process requires the Board and the courts to determine when employer discriminatory conduct constitutes an undue encouragement or discouragement of employee exercise of Section 7 rights by weighing
the social disutility of the interference resulting from the employer conduct
against the social utility of that conduct. There are several sources to which
the Board and the courts look in making this determination. They are the
Act itself (e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(f)(2) (1970); Colgate-PalmolivePeet Co. v. NLRB, 338 U.S. 355, 360-63 (1949)); other legislation (e.g., 29
U.S.C. § 186(a)(3) (1970)); policies implicit in the Act or other legislation
(e.g., Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1961); Ford Motor
Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 339 (1953); Aeronautical Ind. Dist. Lodge 727
v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949); 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(b), 173(d), 185 (a) (1970));
legislative history (e.g., Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-74,
676 (1961); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 47 n. 54 (1954)); and
the Board's own judgment, subject to judicial review, on what decision would
best achieve the purposes of Section 8(a)(3) (e.g., NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388
U.S. 26, 33-34 (1967); NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965);
NLRB v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 429 F.2d 1223, 1231 (3d Cir. 1970)).
142. MERRIAM-WEBSTER NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, verbo "motive"
(2nd ed. 1957).

See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS

AND LEGISLATION 97 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

the word to refer
these meanings of "motive," at times 14 using
8
to both meanings in the same opinion.
143. Thus, the Court was referring to the "consideration prompting an
action" meaning of "motive" when it made the following statements: "The
Act permits a discharge for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with employees. The actual reason for this
discharge, as shown by the unattacked findings of the Board, was his Guild
activity and his agitation for collective bargaining. The statute does not
preclude a discharge on the ostensible grounds for the petitioner's action;
it forbids discharge for what has been found to be the real motive of the
petitioner. The Act does not compel the petitioner to employ anyone; it
does not require that the petitioner retain in its employ an incompetent editor or one who fails faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without
bias or prejudice." Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937)
(emphasis added), and "We agree with the court below that the record
warrants the Board's finding that the strikers were denied reemployment
because of their union activities." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.
177, 189 (1941) (emphasis added).
And, in the following statements the Court was referring to the "something within that incites to action" meaning of "motive": "The Act does not
interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select its
employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of
that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their selforganization and representation,and, on the other hand, the Board is not
entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of
discharge when that right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion. The true purpose is the subject of investigation."
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1937) (emphasis
added). "Under that Section [8(a)(3)] both discrimination and a resulting
discouragement of union membership are necessary, but the added element
The discriminatory act is not by
of unlawful intent is also required ....
itself unlawful unless intended to prejudice the employees' position because
of their membership in the union; some element of antiunion animus is necessary.... " We have determined that the 'real motive' of the employer in
an alleged § 8(a)(3) violation is decisive, Associated Press . . . 301 U.S. 103,
132; if any doubt still persisted, we laid it to rest in Radio Officers' Union
. . .where we reviewed the legislative history of the provision and concluded
that Congress clearly intended the employer's purpose in discriminating to
be controlling." NLRB v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1965)
(emphasis added). "But inquiry under § 8(a) (3) does not usually stop at this
point. The statutory language 'discrimination . . . to . . . discourage' means
that the finding of a violation normally turns on whether the discriminatory
conduct was motivated by an antiunion purpose." NLRB v. Great Dane
Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967) (emphasis added).
At times the Court and the Board have referred to both "consideration
prompting an action=motive" and "something within that incites to action=
motive" in the same paragraph. For example, in Jones & Laughlin, the Court
said: "The order of the Board required the reinstatement of the employees
who were found to have been discharged because of their 'union activity'
and for the purpose of 'discouraging membership in the union.'" 301 U.S.
at 47 (emphasis added). In Radio Officers', the Court said: "Since the rules
were no defense and the employers intended to discriminate solely on the
ground of such protected union activity, it did not matter that they did not
intend to discourage membership since such was a foreseeable result." 347
U.S. at 46 (emphasis added). And, in its 16th Annual Report, the Board
said: "Upon scrutiny of all the facts in a particular case, the Board must
determine whether or not the employer's treatment of the employee was
motivated by a desire to encourage or discourage union membership or
other activities protected by the statute. The Board requires that a prepon-
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It is clear from the statements by the Board and the Court
concerning employer motive that first, the issue of whether or
not the "consideration prompting an action=motive" of an employer was employee exercise of Section 7 rights and second,
the issue of whether or not the "something within that incites
to action-motive" of an employer was antiunion animus are both
relevant in determining whether the employer's conduct was
violative of Section 8 (a) (3).
What is not clear from
overlooked in analyses of
issues are different. Justice
in Teamsters Local 357 v.
these two issues:

these statements and has often been
Section 8(a) (3), is that these two
Harlan's analysis of Section 8(a) (3)
NLRB exemplifies the confusion of

"What in my view is wrong with the Board's position in
these cases is that a mere showing of foreseeable encouragement of union status is not a sufficient basis for a finding of a
violation of the statute. It has long been recognized that an
employer can make reasonable business decisions, unmotivated by an intent to discourage union membership or protected concerted activities, although the foreseeable effect
of these decisions may be to discourage what the act protects.
For example, an employer may discharge an employee because he is not performing his work adequately, whether or
not the employee happens to be a union organizer. See
Labor Board v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429. Yet
a court could hardly reverse a Board finding that such firing
1
would foreseeably tend to discourage union activity."'
In this statement, Justice Harlan seeks to prove the relevance
of "something within that incites to action =motive" by the authority of a case which supports the relevance of "consideration
prompting an action= motive." The issue in Universal Camera
Corp. was not whether the employer was motivated or "unmoderance of the evidence show an employer's illegal motive in order to establish a violation of 8(a)(3), except in cases of per se violations such as the
discharge of an employee admittedly because of activities protected by the
statute....
Moreover, proof of an affirmative defense, such as a contention
that the employee's discharge was for cause or for serious misconduct in
the course of concerted activities, rests with the employer. However, the
fact that a valid cause for discharge or discipline of an employee exists does
not excuse a violation of the act, if the evidence shows that an employer's
real reason was to discourage or encourage union activities of employees."
16 NLRB ANN. REP. 162 (1952) (emphasis added).
144. Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 679 (1961).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

tivated by an intent to discourage union membership," i.e.,
whether the "something within that incites to action = motive" of
the employer was antiunion animus. It was the different and
independent issue of whether the employer was motivated by
the employee's insubordination or by his union activities, i.e.,
whether the "consideration prompting an action =motive" of the
employer was employee exercise of Section 7 rights. 145 The same
1
confusion is exhibited in Justice Harlan's opinion in Darlington.4
Just as an employer may discharge an inefficient union organizer
employee because "he is not performing his work adequately"
even though the employer is antiunion, an employer violates
Section 8(a) (3) of the Act when it discharges an equally inefficient union organizer employee because he is supporting the
union.14 7T What determines whether the employer's conduct was

violative of Section 8 (a) (3) in discharge cases is not its antiunion
animus but whether its "consideration prompting an action=
motive" for the discharge was employee exercise of the Section 7
right to support a union, or the employee's inefficiency. If it was
the former, the discharge is violative of Section 8 (a) (3) even
though the employer was not motivated by antiunion animus ;148
if it was the latter, the discharge is not violative of Section
8(a) (3) even though the employer was virulently opposed to
unions.

149

Another example of the confusion of these two issues is provided by the Court's opinion in Radio Officers" 50 where Part
II.A of that opinion was devoted to the subject "Necessity for
Proving Employer Motive," referring to "something within that
incites to action-motive." However, the court's examples of "real
motive" and "the employer's purpose" in that part of its opinion
were all examples of "consideration prompting an action=mo145. Bee 179 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1950), rev d, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) and 190
F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951).
146. See 380 U.S. at 269 n. 10, 276.
147. Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 778 (1944).
148. E.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); AllisChalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 162 F.2d 435 (7th Cir. 1947); NLRB v. Gluek
Brewing Co., 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Star Publishing Co., 97
F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938).
149. E.g., NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 410 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1969);
Barnwell Garment Co. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 777 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Billen
Shoe Co., 397 F.2d 801, 803 (1st Cir. 1968); Shattuck Denn Mining Corp. v.
NLRB, 362 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1966).
150. 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
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tive." Thus, in citing NLRB v. Associated Press5 1 the Court said:
"In another case the same day we found the employer's 'real
motive' to be decisive and stated that 'the Act permits a discharge
for any reason other than union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with employees .... ,,152 And it supported the
statement that "Congress intended the employer's purpose in
discriminating to be controlling" by quoting the following Senate
Report statement: "Of course nothing in the bill prevents an
employer from discharging a man for incompetence; from advancing him for special aptitude; or from demoting him for
failure to perform." 158 All of these are examples of "consideration
prompting to action=motive" rather than "something within that
incites to action =motive." Thus, the Court mistakenly accepts as
proof of a "necessity for proving employer's [something within
that incites to action=] motive" authorities which require proof
that an employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive"
was employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
The confusion of these two meanings of "motive" would not
be of practical significance if the forms of the two meanings
relevant for Section 8 (a) (3) purposes were conjoint. But they
are not. For while it is true that the two meanings are coexistent, i.e., that whenever a person has a "consideration prompting an action =motive," he also has a "something within that incites to action= motive"; the form of "consideration prompting an
action= motive" that is relevant for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3),
employee exercise of Section 7 rights, is not necessarily conjoint
with the form of "something within that incites to action-motive" that is relevant for purposes of Section 8(a) (3), i.e., antiunion animus. 1 4 An employer's "consideration prompting an ac151. 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
152. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954).
153. Id. at 44.
154. The fact that the two Section 8(a) (3) relevant meanings of "motive"
are not conjoint creates some of the most difficult factual issues in Section
8(a) (3) cases. These are cases in which the evidence proves the existence
of general employer antiunion animus and the Issue is whether this antiunion animus incited the employer to take the particular action that is
alleged to be violative of Section 8(a)(3). Congress' belief that the Board
relied too heavily on general employer antiunion animus to prove that an
employer's actions were incited by antiunion animus and that the employer's
"consideration prompting an action=motive" was therefore employee exercise
of Section 7 rights led to the amendment to Section 10(c) that reads: "No
order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of any individual as an
employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of
any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause."
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tion motive" may be employee exercise of Section 7 rights at the
same time that the employer's "something within that incites to
action = motive" is not antiunion animus. For example, in Republic
Aviation the employer's "consideration prompting an action=
motive" was employee exercise of the Section 7 right to solicit
other employees to become union members, but the employer's
"something within that incites to action = motive" was admittedly
not antiunion animus. The Board had found that one employee
was discharged for infraction of "a general rule against soliciting"
adopted "well before any union activity at the plant.

. .

without

discrimination on the part of the employer toward union activity"
and that the discharges of three other employees for wearing
union steward buttons were "not ... motivated by opposition to
the particular union or ... to unionism."'1 It was on the basis

of these findings that the Court upheld the Board's ruling that
158 In American Ship
the discharges violated Section 8(a) (3).
Building when an employer locked out its employees, its "consideration prompting an action = motive" was the employee exercise of the Section 7 right of adhering to the contract demands
made by their union to point of impasse, but the employer's
"something within that incites to action=motive" was not antiunion animus but an intention "to bring about a settlement of a
labor dispute on favorable terms."'15
Since the Section 8(a) (3) relevant forms of the two meanSee Cox, Some A8pecta of the Labor Management Relatfon

Act, 1947, 61
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1947). It is clear that general employer antiunion
animus is not sufficient to support a finding that an employer's action was
caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights and was therefore "discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a)(3). See cases cited note 149 supra.
155. 324 U.S. at 794-95.
156. Republic Aviation makes it clear that the following statements are
incorrect: "If an employer discharges an employee to protect his interest
in building up an efficient work force, he does not commit an unfair labor
practice, even though the discharged employee is a union leader and organization is thereby set back." Cox, BSome Aspects of the Labor Management
Relation8 Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21 (1947). "It has long been established that a finding of violation under this section will normally turn on
the employer's motivation .... Thus when the employer discharges a union
leader who has broken shop rules, the problem posed is to determine whether
the employer has acted purely in disinterested defense of shop discipline or
has sought to damage employee organization." American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). In Republic Aviation, the employer discharged the employees "to protect his interest in building up an efficient
work force" and "purely in disinterested defense of shop discipline." Yet, its
conduct was held violative of Section 8(a)(3).
157. 380 U.S. at 313. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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ings of "motive" are not necessarily conjoint, we shall examine
the significance of each of them separately.
A.

The Significance of Employer "Motive" ("Consideration
Prompting an Action")

Employer motive in the sense of "the consideration or object
influencing a choice or prompting an action" is always relevant
in determining whether employer conduct violated Section
8(a) (3) because an employer's conduct can only be found violative of Section 8 (a) (3) when it was caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. If the "consideration prompting an
action=motive" for the employer's conduct was anything else,
whether "business, animosity, or . . . sheer caprice,"'1 that conduct cannot be violative of Section 8(a) (3). This follows from
the fact that there can be no violation of Section 8 (a) (3) unless
the "encouragement or discouragement of membership in a
labor organization" is accomplished "by discrimination. '159 "Discrimination" for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3) is "employer treatment of employees affecting their employment conditions caused
by employee exercise of Section 7 rights."10
Hence, there are no cases "under Section 8 (a) (3) in which
the Board may truncate its inquiry" 161 into employer "consideration prompting an action= motive." In each of the cases in which
employers were said'0 2 to have been held to have violated Section 8(a) (3) without proof of "motive," Republic Aviation,
Erie Resistor, Radio Officers', the employer's "consideration
prompting an action= motive" was employee exercise of Section
7 rights. This fact was not proved because it was undisputed.
In Republic Aviation,168 the consideration was employee solicitation of other employees to become union members; in Erie
Resistor,0 4 employee participation in a strike; in Radio Officers',
158. 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 65 (1939).
159. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967); Radio
Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 42-43 (1954).
160. See Shieber: Part I. passim (emphasis added), supra note 2.
161. But see NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967),
American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 312 (1965); Textile Workers
Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 n.10 (1965).
162. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967).
163. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
164. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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employee "right to . . be good, bad, or indifferent" 165 union
members.
The requirement that an employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive" be employee exercise of Section 7 rights
in order for the employer's conduct to be held violative of Section 8(a) (3) is fully supported by the legislative history of
Section 8(a) (3) and the cases under that section. Thus, the
Senate Report cited by the Court in Radio Officers' to support the
proposition that "Congress intended the employer's purpose in
discriminating to be controlling" 166 indicated that it was only
when the employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive" was employee "exercise" of the right of "self-organization
or to join or refrain from joining a labor organization" that its
conduct could be held violative of Section 8(a) (3). The Report
read:
"Of course nothing in the bill prevents an employer from
discharging a man for incompetence; from advancing him for
special aptitude; or from demoting him for failure to perform. But if the right to be free from employer interference in self-organization or to join or refrain from joining
a labor organization is to have any practical meaning, it must
be accompanied by assurance that its exercise will not result
in discriminatory treatment or loss of the oportunity for
work."16
And in 1947, when Congress added the proviso to the Act that
"no order of the Board shall require the reinstataement of any
individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause,"'" Senator Taft
indicated that a Board finding that an employee had been
adversely treated because of "union activity" had been and would
continue to be required for the Board to hold that an employer
had violated Section 8(a) (3). The Senator said: "The Board
will have to determine-and it always has-whether the dis165. 347 U.S. 17, 40 (1954).
166. Id. at 44.
167. 2 1935 LEo. HIST. 2310-11. See 1 1935 LEG. I-DST. 1105; 2 1935 LEa. HIsT.
8069; 1 1935 LEO. HIST. 1126.

OF

168. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
169. 93 CONG. Roc. 6678 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 1595 (1947).
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charge was for cause or for union activity, and the preponderance of the evidence will determine that question."'1 9
That this was the Board's position from the start of its administration of the Act' 70 is clear from the Board's 3d Annual
Report. In that Report, the Board referred to the holding of the
first case it had decided under the Act, that employer conduct
was not violative of Section 8(a) (3) because "the effective
cause" of that conduct had not been employee "union membership or activity."' 7 1 And, after reviewing numerous cases, the
Board concluded:
"The foregoing cases represent the Board's construction of
the scope of section 8(3). Briefly, it forbids the employer
to affect or change an employer relationship because of the
employee's union membership or activity."'172
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that an employer's
"consideration prompting an action=motive" must be employee
exercise of Section 7 rights in Associated Press:
"The actual reason for his discharge, as shown by the
unattacked findings of the Board, was his Guild activity and
his agitation for collective bargaining. The statute does not
preclude a discharge on the ostensible grounds for the petitioner's action; it forbids discharge for what has been found
to be the real motive of the petitioner.
"The act permits a discharge for any reason other than
union activity or agitation for collective bargaining with
"178
employees ....
It is therefore clear that employer "motive" in the sense of
"the consideration or object influencing a choice or prompting an
action" is of the highest significance in Section 8(a) (3) cases.
The Board must examine the employer's "consideration prompting an action= motive" in all Section 8(a) (3) cases in which the
employer denies that it was employee exercise of Section 7
rights. And in order for the Board to hold the employer's conduct violative of Section 8(a) (3), it must find that the employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive" was employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1937).
3 NLRB ANN. REP. 66 (1939).
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937) (emphasis added).
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The Significance of Employer "Motive" ("Something
Within That Incites to Action")

The same degree of relevance does not attach to employer
"motive" in its second meaning, i.e., "something within a person
. . that incites him to action." It is settled that an employer
may be found to have violated Section 8 (a) (3) irrespective of
what his "something within that incites to action-motive" was.
Proof that this kind of motive was antiunion animus is not
required in order for the employer's conduct to be held violative
of Section 8 (a) (3). This was well stated by Judge Paul R. Hays
in contrasting Section 8(a) (3) with certain provisions of the
Selective Service Act:
*

"But the rule as to discrimination which encourages or discourages union membership is clearly different from the rule
as to discrimination against veterans. Under the National
Labor Relations Act there is no requirement of hostility, bad
faith or dishonesty of purpose. Where the action involved is
discriminatory and serves to encourage or discourage union
membership it is inhibited by the statute regardless of
motive.'U174
There are numerous cases holding that employers violated
Section 8(a) (3) when their "something within that incites to
action=motive" was not antiunion animus. In Republic Aviation,
although the employer's conduct was "found not to be motivated
by opposition to the particular union or, we deduce, to unionism, '175 the employer's enforcement of long established general
company rules against employees engaged in union solicitation
was held violative of Section 8 (a) (3).1716 In NLRB v. Star Pub178
lishing Co.177 and NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co.,
employers
174. Alvado v. General Motors Corp., 303 F.2d 718, 722 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 925 (1962).
175. 324 U.S. at 795.
176. Prior to Republic Aviation, company rules prohibiting union solicitation on the employer's premises during an employee's free time were
upheld by the courts as legitimate exercises of management power. As one
court said, "t]here is evidence in the record indicating that discussions of
such matters between employees even during their rest periods became acrimonious, bitter and provocative. If the solicitation for union membership on
its premises during working hours gave rise to bickering, disputes, ill-will
and lack of harmony among its employees, thus affecting their efficiency, it
would not be unreasonable to adopt such a rule as would tend to remove
the causes which lowered their efficiency." Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB,
140 F.2d 714, 716 (8th Cir. 1944).
177. 97 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1938), enforcing 4 N.L.R.B. 498 (1937).
178. 144 F.2d 847 (8th Cir. 1944).
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were held to have violated Section 8 (a) (3) when they adversely
affected their employees' working conditions though in each
case the employer's "something within that incites to action=
motive" was economic survival when faced with a jurisdictional
dispute.'79 In Erie Resistor, the employer was held to have violated Section 8(a) (3) although it was assumed that the "something within that incites to action= motive" for its superseniority
policy was "SOLELY to protect and continue the business" during an economic strike.1 0 And, in Great Dane, the Court stated
that with respect to one category of Section 8(a) (3) cases employer conduct could be held violative of Section 8(a) (3) without proof that the employer's "something within that incites to
action=motive" was antiunion animus:
"From this review of our recent decisions, several principles
of controlling importance here can be distilled. First, if it
can reasonably be concluded that the employer's discriminatory conduct was 'inherently destructive' of important
employee rights, no proof of an antiunion motivation is
needed and the Board can find an unfair labor practice even
if the employer introduces evidence that the conduct was
motivated by business considerations."'8 13
It is therefore clear that under Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act
there is no requirement that it be proved that the "something
within that incites to action=motive" for an employer's conduct
was antiunion animus in order to sustain a charge that by that
179. The fact that the employer in Star Publishing was not motivated
by antiunion animus Is emphasized by the concurring opinion of Judge
Stephens, who said: "I think It right and just for this court to say that, so
far as the record goes, Respondent has endeavored to live up to the letter
and spirit of the Wagner Act . . . and that its violation was solely because
of the very serious dilemma into which Respondent was precipitated by the
demand that forthwith Its . . . [employees] should be Teamster Union men
instead of Guild members." 97 F.2d at 471.
In Gluek Brewing, the court said, "It Is clear that it [the employer] had
no purpose-in the sense of animus or desire-to injure one or to help the
other. Its underlying and compelling purpose was to save itself." 144 F.2d
at 853.
180. 373 U.S. at 226.
181. 388 U.S. at 34. As stated earlier, we believe that the Court eliminated
any requirement of proving antiunion animus in all cases in which an
employer's discriminatory conduct discouraged employee exercise of Section
7 rights in Fleetwood Trailer. See pp. 14-15 supra.
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conduct the employer violated Section 8(a) (3).182 The dicta to
the contrary are based on an incorrect reading of the statutory
language or on the mistaken belief that statements that require
proof of "consideration prompting an action =motive" pertained
to "something within that incites to action =motive." Thus, the
statement that:
"The statutory language 'discrimination . . .to .

. discour-

age' means that the finding of a violation normally turns on
whether the discriminatory conduct was motivated by an
antiunion purpose"'18
misreads the statutory language. It is clear from the syntax of
Section 8 (a) that the word "to" in subsection (3) does not mean
"in order to" or "for the purpose of" but is simply part of the
infinitives "to encourage or [to] discourage." Section 8(a) provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
- (1) to interfere . . . . ; (2) to dominate or interfere ....;
(3) .. .to encourage or discourage .. . ; (4) to discharge or
otherwise discriminate . . ; (5) to refuse . . . . "1 Any other

reading of Section 8 (a) (3) makes it incomplete since it does not
then have a verb expressing what action performed by an employer is proscribed as an unfair labor practice. 185
As for the confusion of the two meanings of "motive" and
the mistaken reliance on authorities requiring that an employer's
"consideration prompting an action = motive" be employee exercise of Section 7 rights to support statements that an employer's
"something within that incites to action= motive" must be antiunion animus in order that the employer's conduct may be held
violative of Section 8(a) (3), we have already exemplified
them."' One more example will be given here. In NLRB v.
Brown the Court said:
182. See cases cited note 148 supra. Contra, Mohland v. NLRB, 422
F.2d 1258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839 (1970); Cooper Thermometer
Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965); see Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20-21 (1947).
183. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 33 (1967). Accord,
Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 57-58 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
185. Accord, Ward, '"Discrimination"Under the National Labor Relations
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1152, 1156 (1939); 13 NLRB ANN REP. 49 (1949).

Contra,

Christensen & Svanoe, Motive and Intent in the Commission of Unfair
Labor Practices: The Supreme Court and the Fictive Formality, 77 YALE
L.J. 1269, 1272-73 (1968).
186. See pp. 39-41 supra.
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"Under that section [8(a) (3)] both discrimination and a
resulting discouragement of union membership are necessary,
but the added element of unlawful intent is also required.
...The discriminatory act is not by itself unlawful unless
intended to prejudice the employees' position because of
their membership in the union; some element of antiunion
animus is necessary ....

We have determined that the 'real

motive' of the employer in an alleged § 8 (a) (3) violation is
decisive. Associated Press .

. .

301 U.S. 103,132; if any doubt

still persisted we laid it to rest in Radio Oficers' Union...
where we reviewed the legislative history of the provision
and concluded that Congress clearly intended the employer's
purpose in discriminating to be controlling."1 7'
As was indicated earlier, the reference in Associated Press
to the "real motive" of the employer was to the "consideration
prompting an action - motive," i.e., whether the "actual reason"
for the discharge of an employee was "union activity or agitation
for collective bargaining with employees" or incompetence and
failure "faithfully to edit the news to reflect the facts without
bias and prejudice."18 8 And the legislative history reviewed by
the Court in Radio Officers' also referred to the employer's "consideration prompting an action motive," for the Senate Report
quoted by the Court stated: "Of course nothing in the bill prevents an employer from discharging a man for incompetence;
from advancing him for special aptitude; or from demoting him
for failure to perform.' n 9 Thus, in Brown the authorities cited
as establishing the supposed requirement that "some element of
antiunion animus is necessary" to prove a violation of Section
8 (a) (3), do not refer to antiunion animus at all but to whether
an employer's "consideration prompting an action =motive" was
employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
Clearly, then, proof that an employer's "something within
that incites to action=motive" was antiunion animus is not
required to sustain a finding that the employer's conduct was
violative of Section 8 (a) (3). But the fact that it is not required,
does not mean that it can not be relevant. Employer antiunion
187. 380 U.S. at 286-87.
188. NLRB v. Associated Press, 301 U.S. 103, 130 (1937). See text at note
143 supra.
189. 347 U.S. at 44.
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animus can be relevant in proving the existence of the two elements of a violation of Section 8(a) (3), "discrimination" and
discouragement of "membership in any labor organization." In
order for an employer's conduct to constitute "discrimination"
the employer's "consideration prompting an action = motive" must
be employee exercise of Section 7 rights. Frequently, proof that
an employer's "something within that incites to action = motive"
was antiunion animus is relevant in proving that its "consideration prompting an action = motive" was employee exercise of Section 7 rights. 90 And, although general antiunion animus is not
a sufficient basis for the holding that an employer's conduct violated Section 8(a) (3),"'1 it is "properly a factor in evaluating
conduct, particularly in the area of motivation .... -192 Thus,
when a senior employee with a good record is discharged for a
minor infraction of company rules shortly after the employer
becomes aware of the employee's union activities, the employer's
general attitude of antiunion animus is relevant in determining
whether its "consideration prompting an action=motive" for the
discharge was employee exercise of Section 7 rights or the rule
infraction. The relevance of antiunion animus to the issue of
whether employer conduct was "discrimination" was well stated
by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:
"The conclusion is inescapable that the company's attitude
toward the union was one of animosity and hostility at the
time of the layoffs in question. The significance of such bias
in determining an employer's motive for conduct which
allegedly violates section 8(a) (3) has been recognized by
the courts. [Citations omitted.]
"The coalescent factors-the company's antiunion bias, its
knowledge of the union activities of Rinaca and Lucas and
its prior discrimination against them-were sufficient, in our
view, to establish prima facie violations of section 8(a) (3)
and, in order to overcome the resulting presumption of discrimination, the company must assume the burden of show190. See, e.g., Borek Motor Sales, Inc. v. NLRB, 425 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 823 (1970); Russell Newman Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d
1280 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. White Motor Corp., 404 F.2d 1100 (6th Cir.

1968).
191. See cases cited note 149 supra.
192. Waycross Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 403 F.2d 832, 833 (5th Cir. 1968)

(Brown, C.J.).

1972]

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

ing a justifiable or nondiscriminatory reason for the lay19 8
offs."
The fact that an employer's "something within that incites
to action = motive" was antiunion animus makes it more probable
that its conduct will be held to be an undue discouragement of
employee exercise of Section 7 rights. It has this effect because
by increasing the danger of interference with employee exercise
of Section 7 rights and the alarm that employees will tend to
feel about exercising them, it increases the social disutility of
the employer's conduct. Since the social disutility of the employer's conduct is increased, the Board and the courts are more
likely to conclude that this social disutility outweighs its social
utility, its business justification, and therefore results in an undue
discouragement of "membership in any labor organization."
Thus, while proof that an employer's "something within that
incites to action= motive" was antiunion animus is not required
to establish that employer conduct was violative of Section
8 (a) (3), such proof is frequently relevant in proving the existence of one or both of the required elements of a Section
8(a) (3) violation.

III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETwEEN SEcCTION
8 (a) (3) AND SECTION 8 (a) (1)
Having completed the examination of Section 8(a) (3), we
are now in a position to examine the relationship between that
section and Section 8(a) (1). We have seen that there are two
elements to a Section 8(a) (3) violation: "discrimination" and
undue discouragement of employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
Section 8 (a) (1) is more simple. It provides that: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer- (1) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7]."'14
Thus, according to its language there is only one element to
a Section 8 (a) (1) unfair labor practice: interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights. But, not every interference
with the exercise of Section 7 rights is violative of Section
8 (a) (1). It is only when the interference with employee exercise
193. Maphis Chapman Corp. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 298, 804 (4th Cir. 1966).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
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of Section 7 rights is undue that the employer's action is violative
of Section 8 (a) (1). Both the validity of this statement and the
method for determining whether any given interference with
employee exercise of Section 7 rights is undue are indicated by
the Court's statements in Darlingtonand Republic Aviation. In
Darlington,the Court said:
"Naturally, certain business decisions will, to some degree,
interfere with concerted activities by employees. But it is
only when the interference with § 7 rights outweighs the
business justification for the employer's action that § 8 (a) (1)
is violated."'1 5
And in Republic Aviation, the Court said:
"These cases bring here for review the action of the
National Labor Relations Board in working out an adjustment between the undisputed right of self-organization
assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally
undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their
establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not
unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without
regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others
may place upon employer or employee. Opportunity to organize and proper discipline are both essential elements in a
balanced society."'"6
Thus, the single element of a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) is
undue interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
And whether or not an employer's conduct resulted in an undue
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights is determined by the same weighing process that determines whether
its conduct was an undue discouragement of employee exercise
of Section 7 rights for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3).197 And, just
as employer "something within that incites to action= motive" is
relevant under Section 8 (a) (3), since danger to and employee
alarm about exercise of Section 7 rights are increased when an
195. 380 U.S. at 268-69. Accord, Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB,
430 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1970).
196. 324 U.S. at 797-98. Accord, NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S.
375, 378 (1967).
197. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378 (1967); American
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 338-41 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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employer's "something within that incites to action=motive" is
antiunion animus, so it is relevant under Section 8(a) (1).
This can be seen from the cases holding that it is an unfair
labor practice under Section 8 (a) (1) for an employer "to prohibit union solicitation on company premises during working
hours ....
when it is demonstrated that the prohibition was
adopted for the purpose of discouraging union activity ....
In these cases, despite the fact that there is no Section 7 right to
engage in union solicitation during working hours 99 the fact that
the employer's motive for prohibiting such solicitation was antiunion animus increases employee alarm sufficiently to make the
social disutility of the prohibition outweigh its social utility, i.e.,
the importance to an enterprise that management have the
power to require that work time be for work. The interference
with employee exercise of Section 7 rights is therefore undue
and violative of Section 8 (a) (1).
We therefore see that Sections 8(a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) have
one element in common. Under either section employer conduct
will be held an unfair labor practice only if the Board and the
courts conclude that the employer's conduct was an undue interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights. The fact
that there can be no violation of Section 8(a) (3) unless the
undue interference with employee exercise Section 7 rights was
caused "by discrimination" distinguishes Section 8(a) (3) from
Section 8 (a) (1). Let us see the effect of the absence or presence
of "discrimination" in determining whether employer conduct
that interfered with employee exercise of Section 7 rights is violative of Section 8 (a) (1), Section 8 (a) (3), or both.
First, let us assume that employer conduct interferes with
employee exercise of Section 7 rights and that it is not "discrimination." Obviously, that conduct cannot be violative of Section 8 (a) (3) which requires that the employer conduct be "discrimination" before an unfair labor practice under that section
can be found. However, that conduct may be violative of Section
8(a) (1) which has no such requirement. The leading case is
198. Steelworkers v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1968), enforcing
165 N.L.R.B. 54 (1964). See also Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc. v.
NLRB, 405 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Electro Plastic Fabrics, Inc.,
381 F.2d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 1967).
199. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 n.10 (1945).
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NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc. 20 0 In that case the employer discharged two employees because of its honest but mistaken belief
that they had threatened to dynamite the plant if the union
that they were supporting was not chosen to represent the
employees. The Board found that the employees had not made
the alleged threat and held that their discharge violated Sections
8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3). The court of appeals denied enforcement
of the Board's order on the ground that the employer's action
was not "discrimination discouraging protected activity. ' 20 1 The
Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that the
employer's conduct was an unfair labor practice under Section
8 (a) (1), and found it unnecessary to determine whether it was
also violative of Section 8 (a) (3).
The Supreme Court's refusal to find a violation of Section
8 (a) (3) was plainly correct since the employer's conduct was
not "discrimination." "Discrimination" for the purposes of Section 8(a) (3) is employer treatment of employees caused by
employee exercise of Section 7 rights. Thus, to have "discrimination" an employer's "consideration prompting an action= motive"
must be employee exercise of Section 7 rights. In Burnup & Sims
the employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive"
was not the employees' union activities but rather their supposed
threat to use unlawful violence against the employer's property.
Since the employer treatment of employees in Burnup & Sims
was not caused by employee exercise of Section 7 rights, it was
not "discrimination" and the employer's conduct could therefore
not be held violative of Section 8(a) (3). 202
Moreover, in our opinion, the Court's conclusion that the
employer's action violated Section 8 (a) (1) correctly strikes the
balance between the social utility of the business justification for
the employer's action and the social disutility of the interference
with employee exercise of Section 7 rights resulting from that
action. While it is true that the social utility was substantial,
since the employer acted "to avoid dynamiting of a silo," 2 8 the
alarm and danger resulting from the employer's action, the measure of its social disutility, were also great. As the Court pointed
200. 379 U.S. 21 (1964). Contra, Colonial Corp. of America v. NLRB, 427
F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1970), denying enforcement of 171 N.L.R.B. 1553 (1968).
201. 322 F.2d 57, 61 (5th Cir. 1963).
202. Contra, Comment, 114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 866, 879 (1966).
203. 379 U.S. 21, 25 n.2 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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out, allowing the discharge of innocent employees for alleged
acts of misconduct engaged in the course of a protected activity
would result in
"the protected activity los[ing] some of its immunity, since
the example of employees who are discharged on false
charges would or might have a deterrent effect on other
employees. Union activity often engenders strong emotions
and gives rise to active rumors. A protected activity acquires
a precarious status if innocent employees can be discharged
while engaging in it, even though the employer acts in good
faith. It is the tendency of those discharges to weaken or
'' 20 4
destroy the § 8(a) (1) rights that is controlling.
We agree with the Court's conclusion that the social disutility
of employer conduct that creates this degree of danger to and
alarm about employee exercise of Section 7 rights outweighs the
social utility of the employer's power to act on the basis of an
honest but mistaken belief that its property is threatened.2 5
Another situation in which the discharge of an employee
would be violative of Section 8(a) (1) but not violative of Section 8(a) (3) would be one in which the employee was discharged because of his race. The discharge could be held violative of Section 8 (a) (1) as an undue interference with employee
exercise of Section 7 rights on the basis of the reasoning in Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB.20 6 The Board could conclude that
the discharge of an employee because of his race was an undue
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights because
it
"sets up an unjustified clash of interests between groups of
workers which tends to reduce the likelihood and the effec204. Id. at 23-24. See J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 895-902
(1966) (trial examiner's decision). The danger that other employers will
Interfere with employee exercise of Section 7 rights by inventing charges of
misconduct against active union supporters is also very great. This danger

adds to the social disutility of the employer's action.
205. Since the decision in Burnup & Sims, the Board has relied on Sec-

tion 8(a) (1) to hold that an employer's refusal to reinstate employees based

on Its honest but mistaken belief that they had engaged In misconduct dur-

ing a strike was an unfair labor practice. See Plastic Applicators, Inc., 150
N.L.R.B. 123 (1964).

The court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's

order on the ground that the Board had failed to prove that the "misconduct did not in fact occur." NLRB v. Plastic Applicators, Inc., 369 F.2d 495,
498 (5th Cir. 1966).
206. 416 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).

Accord,

Tipler v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33

tiveness of their working in concert to achieve their legitimate goals under the Act; and ... creates in its victims an

their
apathy or docility which inhibits them from asserting
'20 7
rights against the perpetrator of the discrimination.
Of course, a discharge of an employee because of his race could
not be an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (3) since the
discharge would not have been caused by employee exercise of
Section 7 rights and the employer's conduct would therefore not
be "discrimination" for purposes of Section 8(a) (3).
Burnup & Sims, holding employer conduct violative of Section 8 (a) (1) when it is not violative of Section 8 (a) (3), is in
accord with the intended scope of Section 8(a) (1). Congress
intended Section 8(a) (1) to provide "general guaranties" for
the protection of employee exercise of Section 7 rights. This is
clear from the Committee reports on that section. Thus, the
House Report stated:
"The succeeding unfair labor practices are intended to amplify and state more specifically certain types of interference
and restraint that experience has proven require such amplification and specification. These specific practices, as enumerated in subsections (2), (3), (4), and (5), are not intended
to limit in any way the interpretation of the general provisions of subsection (1).1"20
We see therefore, that one aspect of the relationship between
Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) is that while the absence of "discrimination" prevents a finding that employer conduct was violative of Section 8 (a) (3) it does not bar a finding of an unfair
labor practice under Section 8 (a) (1).
The other aspects of the relationship between these two sections appear when we examine cases in which the employer's
conduct was "discrimination." The cases fall into two categories:
(1) cases in which the employer's conduct was "discrimination"
207. 416 F.2d at 1135.
208. 2 1935 LEG. HIsT. 3066. The Senate Report contains a similar state-

ment. "The four succeeding unfair labor practices are designed not to
impose limitations or restriction upon the general guaranties of the first, but
rather to spell out with particularity some of the practices that have been
most prevalent and most troublesome." 2 1935 LEG. HIST. 2309. Contra, Comment, 114 U. PA. L. Rsv. 866, 879 (1966); cf. NLRB v. Scrivener, 92 S. Ct. 798,
803 (1972).
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and it is found that the conduct resulted in an undue interference
with employee exercise of Section 7 rights and (2) cases in which
the employer's conduct was "discrimination" and it is found that
the conduct did not result in an undue interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
A typical case in the first category is one in which an employer discharges an employee who is both inefficient and a union
leader because of his union activities. 209 In this case, there is
"discrimination" since the discharge was caused by employee
exercise of the Section 7 right to be an active union man, and
there is undue discouragement of employee exercise of Section
7 rights since the social disutility outweighs the social utility of
the management power to discharge inefficient employees
because of their union activities. Since the two elements of
Section 8(a) (3) violation are present, the employer's conduct is
also an unfair labor practice under Section 8(a) (1) which
requires only the element of undue interference with employee
exercise of Section 7 rights. But it is only a violation of Section
8(a) (1) because of the presence of the element of "discrimination"; it would not be a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) to discharge
an inefficient employee who is a union leader because of his
inefficiency, even though the discharge would interfere with
210
and cause alarm about employee exercise of Section 7 rights.
Since the presence of the element of "discrimination" is necessary to make the employer's conduct in this case a violation of
Section 8 (a) (1), this is the type of case to which Justice Harlan
referred in Darlingtonwhen he said:
"Whatever may be the limits of § 8 (a) (1), some employer
decisions are so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would never constitute violations of § 8 (a) (1),
whether or not they involved sound business judgment,
unless they also violated § 8 (a) (3). Thus, it is not questioned in this case that an employer has the right to terminate his business, whatever the impact of such action on
concerted activities, if the decision to close is motivated by
other than discriminatory reasons. But such action, if dis209. See, e.g., Budd Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 138 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 778 (1944).
210. See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965).
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criminatorily motivated, is encompassed within the literal
language of § 8 (a) (3)."211

We see therefore that another aspect of the relationship
between Sections 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1) is that when both "discrimination" and undue interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights are present, the employer's conduct is violative
of both of these sections.
There are numerous cases in the second category, i.e., where
the employer's conduct is "discrimination" and it is found that
the conduct does not result in an undue interference with em2 12
ployee exercise of Section 7 rights. Examples include Mackay,
Buffalo Linen,21

8

Brown,214 American Ship Building21 5 and Dar-

lington.216

In each of these cases the employer's conduct was
"discrimination" since it was caused by employee exercise of
Section 7 rights to strike, to adhere to the collective bargaining
demands pressed by their union, or to choose to be represented
by a union. Yet in each of these cases, it was decided that the
employer's conduct did not violate Section 8(a) (3) because it
was not an undue interference with employee exercise of Section
7 rights. As we have seen, this conclusion is based on the courts'
judgment that the social utility of the business justification for
the employer's conduct outweighs the social disutility of the
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights resulting
from that conduct. In this type of case, it follows, a fortiori,
from a finding of no violation of Section 8 (a) (3) that there is no
violation of Section 8(a) (1). If an employer's conduct is not
an undue interference with employee exercise of Section 7
rights when it is "discrimination," certainly that conduct would
not be considered an undue interference with employee exercise
of Section 7 rights if it were to be examined as non-discriminatory conduct. This is true because employee alarm about and
danger of interference with exercise of Section 7 rights will tend
to be lessened when the employer does not use the exercise of
Section 7 rights as a basis for its treatment of employees. And
since employee alarm about and danger to exercise of Section 7
211. 380 U.S. at 269.
212. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).

213.
214.
215.
216.

NLRB v. Teamsters Local 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
380 U.S. 278 (1965).
380 U.S. 300 (1965).
380 U.S. 263 (1965).
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rights is the measure of the social disutility of the interference
with exercise of those rights, the social disutility of the employer's conduct will always be less when it is not "discrimination." Given this lessened social disutility of the interference
with employee exercise of Section 7 rights when the employer's
conduct is not "discrimination" and the fact that the social utility
of the business justification for the employer's conduct remains
the same, discriminatory conduct that was found not to be an
undue discouragement of employee exercise of Section 7 rights
for purposes of Section 8(a) (3) could not then be found an
undue interference with employee exercise of those rights for
purposes of Section 8 (a) (1).
Thus, where there is no "discrimination" there can be no
violation of Section 8 (a) (3), but there can be a violation of Section 8 (a) (1) if the employer's conduct is an undue interference
with employee exercise of Section 7 rights; where there is "discrimination" and undue interference with employee exercise of
Section 7 rights, there is a violation of both Sections 8 (a) (3)
and 8 (a) (1) ; and where there is "discrimination" and no undue
interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights, there can
not be a violation of either Section 8 (a) (3) or 8 (a) (1).
CONCLUSION

The analysis of Section 8 (a) (3) contained in this article and
in the article on "discrimination 21T indicates that there are two
elements of a violation of that section. They are "discrimination" and "encourage [ment] or discourage [ment] [of] membership in any labor organization." "Discrimination" is employer
treatment of employees affecting their working conditions caused
by employee exercise of Section 7 rights. And "encourage [ment]
or discourage [ment] [of] membership in any labor organization"
caused by "discrimination" is violative of Section 8 (a) (3) only
when it is undue.
In determining whether the encouragement or discouragement resulting from employer conduct is undue and hence violative of Section 8 (a) (3), "the true grounds of decision are considerations of policy and of social advantage .... 218 Discour217. See Shieber: Part I., supra note 2.
218. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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agement will be held to be undue when the Board and the courts
conclude that the social disutility of the interference with employee exercise of Section 7 rights caused by the employer's discriminatory conduct outweighs the social utility of the business
justification for that conduct.
And the measures of social utility and disutility of employer
conduct are, respectively, the extent to which the conduct tends
to enhance management's ability to make an enterprise efficient
and profitable and the alarm about and danger to employee exercise of Section 7 rights caused by the conduct.
By distinguishing between two meanings of "motive," the
analysis contained herein also clarifies the significance of employer motive for purposes of Section 8 (a) (3). Motive means
"the consideration prompting an action." It also means "something within a person that incites him to action." Determination
of what the employer's motive was, in the sense of the "consideration prompting an action," is always relevant for purposes of
Section 8(a) (3). Since discrimination for purposes of Section
8(a) (3) is employer conduct caused by employee exercise of
Section 7 rights, the employer's "consideration prompting an action =motive" must be employee exercise of Section 7 rights for
that conduct to be discrimination. If an employer's "consideration prompting an action=motive" is something other than employee exercise of Section 7 rights, that conduct is not discrimination and therefore cannot be violative of Section 8 (a) (3).
However, Section 8 (a) (3) does not require determination of
what the employer's motive was in the sense of something within
the employer that incites him to action. There is no requirement
that the "something within that incites to action =motive" of an
employer be antiunion animus in order for the employer's conduct to be violative of Section 8 (a) (3). As we saw, there are
numerous cases in which this kind of employer motive was not
antiunion animus and the employer conduct was nevertheless
held to be an unfair labor practice under Section 8 (a) (3).
But although there is no requirement that an "employer's
something within that incites to action-motive" be antiunion
animus, when it is antiunion animus that may be relevant to a
finding of a violation of Section 8 (a) (3). First, the fact that an
employer's "something within that incites to action=motive

1972]

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

61

was antiunion animus is some evidence that its "consideration
prompting an action=motive" was employee exercise of Section
7 rights. Second, when an employer's "something within that
incites to action=motive" is antiunion animus, the social disutility of the employer's conduct is increased because the danger of
similar action by him and other employers and the alarm that
conduct creates among his employees is increased. As we saw, in
almost all cases this increased social disutility is sufficient to outweigh the social utility of the business justification for the employer's conduct and is therefore sufficient to cause that conduct
to be considered violative of Section 8 (a) (3) as an undue discouragement of membership in any labor organization.

